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ABSTRACT 
The Department of Defense and the intelligence community rely on space systems for a 
broad spectrum of services. These systems operate in highly constrained environments (in 
terms of space, weight and power), making virtualization and resource sharing a desirable 
approach. Agencies are actively exploring new architectures, such as those employing 
virtualization, to support their growing space mission. In this thesis, we review how 
virtualization architectures claim to support the real-time requirements of their guests. 
We survey real-time systems and virtualization architectures proposed for use in space 
systems. Further, we investigate the behaviors of virtualized operating systems using a 
method of remote network-based fingerprinting with TCP timestamps. Our work 
provides insights into how guests, both general purpose and real-time, behave in 
virtualized environments. Our survey work and experimental analysis aim to further 
understanding of how virtualization can be securely incorporated into space systems. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
Virtualization has proven itself a viable approach to resource sharing in terrestrial 
systems but its use in space systems is a relatively new idea (Cudmore, 2013). Space 
systems have a number of unique needs, such as space, weight and power (SWaP) 
constraints and real-time requirements (Kang & Kim, 2014). There are many proposed 
virtualization architectures for space, but their ability to support systems with real-time 
requirements needs to be better understood. The role of virtualization in the context of 
real-time requirements is the focus of this thesis. In particular, we survey the design, 
implementation and performance of real-time operating systems and virtualization 
platforms proposed for space. We attempt to understand how these virtualization 
architectures claim to support the real-time requirements of the systems they host. We 
review the security properties of these systems, such as how process isolation is achieved. 
We also consider a practical aspect to security that has received little prior attention: we 
extend prior work on remote fingerprinting virtualized operating systems to consider 
fingerprinting real-time systems. The broad goal of this thesis is to express the 
relationship between virtualization and real-time systems, using space as a motivating 
context.  
A. MOTIVATION 
The use of space systems has grown dramatically since their inception. This 
motivates the development of new space system architectures able to support this 
demand. General William Shelton of Air Force Space Command claims that space was 
once a domain in which a single satellite orbited earth and is now one that supports nearly 
every United States military operation across the world (Garamone, 2014). The 
Department of Defense (DOD) relies on space systems for a broad spectrum of services, 
including communications, mission specific intelligence, operational awareness and 
weather analysis. The 2000 National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Commission Report 
describes how the demand for data from NRO satellites has increased disproportionally to 
the resources provisioned, which is putting pressure on the office to meet all the 
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 requirements from its customers (“Report of the National Commission for the Review of 
the National Reconnaissance Office,” 2000). The DOD recognizes this strain on space 
system resources and is developing strategies to overcome such issues. One such strategy 
is the development of alternative architectures to make space systems more flexible, more 
secure and less costly. The 2011 National Security Space Strategy emphasizes the need to 
develop a “resilient, flexible, and healthy space industrial base” and states that it will 
“continue to explore a mix of capabilities with shorter development cycles to minimize 
delays, cut cost growth, and enable more rapid technology maturation, innovation, and 
exploitation” (Department of Defense [DOD], 2011).  
At the same time, the functional requirements of embedded systems in the space 
domain and the hardware that supports them have become more complex over the past 
two decades (Andrews, Bate, Nolte, Otero-Perez, & Petters, 2005; Windsor, Deredempt, 
& De-Ferluc, 2011). Many systems are now moving to multicore processors instead of 
single core processors, which complicate the systems’ ability to safely and securely 
support isolated real-time processes (Santangelo, 2013). As a result, efforts are being 
made to consolidate the code base of these complex systems and to design a robust 
management infrastructure to maintain temporal and spatial isolation between real-time 
applications and to limit security vulnerabilities (Joe et al., 2012; DaSilva, 2012; Windsor 
et al., 2011). 
The DOD faces a number of challenges in the space domain given the numerous 
requirements for space systems vital to national security today. The DOD needs to 
incorporate the growing complexities of embedded systems in space while 
simultaneously cutting the costs of space missions and increasing the flexibility and 
adaptability of these systems. The U.S. space industry is exploring different ways to 
effectively address these needs (Cudmore, 2013). One solution that has gained 
considerable traction is to move away from federated system architectures, integrating 
software components into a tightly-coupled, modular architecture. The avionics industry 
paved the way to such an integrated architecture with its development of the integrated 
modular avionics (IMA) architecture. The space industry is now in the process of 
 2 
 developing an architecture similar to IMA that addresses the unique requirements of 
space systems (Windsor et al., 2011). 
B. IMA AND IMA-SP 
The IMA conceptual architecture centralizes the various functions and services 
involved in a complex avionics system onto a single set of physical resources (Rushby, 
2000; DaSilva, 2012). IMA was introduced by the commercial avionics industry in the 
1990s (Ramsey, 2007). The motivation for IMA was to reduce costs associated with 
distributed hardware systems while maintaining the ability to manage the software in 
avionics systems efficiently, safely and securely. IMA was also meant to make system 
development easier by enabling incremental validation and parallel development of 
components (Windsor & Hjortnaes, 2009). The two key principles of security in the IMA 
construct are spatial and temporal isolation (Parkinson, 2011). Spatial isolation is 
achieved through software partitions, which are implemented in order to handle fault 
containment. If a fault event occurs in one partition, it is isolated to that partition and 
does not affect the other partitions in the system (Rushby, 2000). Temporal isolation is 
achieved through a statically defined scheduling algorithm for each partition, which 
regulates the amount of processing power each partition receives (DaSilva, 2012). An 
attractive method for implementing the IMA concept is through virtualization. Instead of 
having a distributed network of hardware devices that are each dedicated to specific 
functions, virtualization allows applications running in different software partitions to 
share the same hardware resources. IMA’s use is widespread throughout the commercial 
avionics industry (FAA, 2007) and its successful implementation has motivated the space 
industry to consider a similar conceptual framework (Diniz & Rufino, 2005).  
To the best of our knowledge, the majority of work in developing an IMA 
construct for space has been done by the European Space Agency. Claudio DaSilva 
discusses the European Space Agency’s work in developing the Integrated Modular 
Avionics for Space (IMA-SP) platform. He argues that the space industry lacks 
standardization and is in need of a partitioned software architecture like IMA. He notes, 
however, that there are several unique characteristics of the space domain that need to be 
 3 
 considered in the development of an IMA framework for space, including the limited 
power, mass and volume resources of space systems, which the ESA is currently studying 
(DaSilva, 2012). Windsor et al. (2011) also discuss the ESA’s work in evaluating 
Integrated Modular Avionics for Space (IMA-SP) and the current work in defining and 
demonstrating the IMA-SP construct with other members of the space community. 
NASA is cognizant of the need for more modular software architectures in space and is 
currently researching the benefits of virtualization and partitioning architectures in space, 
with the same goals as IMA-SP (Cudmore, 2013; Rushby, 2011). Many U.S. companies 
developing software products for the aerospace industry are also aware of the movement 
towards integrated architectures in space and are developing products that adhere to the 
IMA architecture.  
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter II, we review requirements of real-
time operating systems for space systems, software compliance standards for space 
systems and an overview of virtualization architectures. In Chapter III and IV, we survey 
several real-time operating systems and virtualization architectures designed for space 
systems. In Chapter V, we present our work in network-based fingerprinting of 
virtualized operating systems, and in Chapter VI, we conclude and discuss future work.  
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 II. BACKGROUND 
In this chapter, we review a number of topics that provide context for the real-
time operating systems and virtualization architectures we survey later. First, we discuss 
real-time operating systems and the requirements for real-time operating systems in 
space. We review security criteria for space systems and software standards for space 
applications. Finally, we review common virtualization architectures and prior work 
relating to virtualization with real-time operating systems.  
A. REAL-TIME OPERATING SYSTEMS 
NASA defines a real-time operating system (RTOS) as a “preemptive 
multitasking operating system intended for real-time applications” and lists several 
features that an RTOS should have, which are summarized in Table 1.  
Table 1.   Characteristic Features of an RTOS (from “RTOS 101,” n.d.) 
Characteristics of an RTOS 
Scheduling mechanism that guarantees response 
time 
Task prioritization 
Support for task synchronization 
Priority inheritance 
Hardware and software resource management 
Guarantees tasks get completed by a deadline 
Deterministic 
Minimal latency 
Minimal context switching 
 
There are three primary categories for deadlines of real-time tasks: soft, firm and 
hard. Soft deadlines are those that are desirable but, if not met, will not cause serious 
damage to the system. If a firm deadline is missed, the system will not encounter total 
 5 
 failure but consecutive firm deadline misses could lead to system failure. Hard deadlines 
are ones that, if missed, result in catastrophic consequences to the system (“RTOS 101,” 
n.d.).  
What distinguishes an RTOS from a general-purpose operating system (GPOS) is 
the way it handles task scheduling and preemption in the kernel (Leroux, 2005). An 
RTOS schedules tasks based on their priority or deadline whereas a GPOS generally 
schedules tasks in a manner that maintains high throughput. An RTOS allows calls to the 
kernel to be preempted by user tasks that have higher priority whereas a GPOS requires 
that calls to the kernel be completed before another task can run, even if the task waiting 
is of higher priority than the task making the kernel call (“GPOS vs. RTOS,” 2012).  
B. REAL-TIME OPERATING SYSTEMS IN SPACE 
RTOSs are used extensively in space operations due to the time-sensitive and 
safety-critical operations handled, such as attitude and orbit control, navigation, 
communications, critical payload management and power management (Keesee, 2003). 
Unlike those for terrestrial systems, RTOSs for space systems must perform their 
functions under harsh environments over the lifetime of the space mission, which can be 
over a decade in some cases (Air Force Space Command, 2013). Additionally, RTOSs 
must be compatible with space-qualified hardware. For example, a relatively small 
number of processors are designed to withstand the radiation present in space 
environments by being radiation-hardened (RAD-HARD) (Beus-Dukic, 2001; Ginosar, 
2012). Further, efforts need to be taken to manage the size, weight and power (SWaP) of 
all space system components, including the operating system. Thus, RTOSs used for 
space systems often have a smaller memory footprint to accommodate SWaP constraints 
(Jones & Gross, 2014; Cudmore, 2013). 
Beus-Dukic conducted a survey at the 1999 Eurospace conference among 
conference participants on the criteria they felt was most important when choosing a 
commercial RTOS for space system development. The survey found that most 
participants considered RTOS configurability, scalability and hardware compatibility to 
be essential features of an RTOS. Also of high importance were support for specific 
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 programming languages and the availability of development tools. Unfortunately, there 
has not been a comparable survey since this, but their data gives us some insight into 
what criteria might be used by developers when choosing a commercial RTOS.  
C. SOFTWARE COMPLIANCE IN SPACE SYSTEMS 
The use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products in space systems introduces 
some unique concerns in the space industry. NASA identifies some of these concerns, 
including the possible lack of documentation; the inability to examine the source code of 
proprietary software; the questionable development process of the code base; and the lack 
of required functionality or the addition of unnecessary functionality (NASA, 2004a). 
Since much of the software used in space systems is commercially developed, a series of 
standards and guidelines exist to help ensure software meets basic safety and security 
requirements for space systems. It should be noted that—while the U.S. space industry 
has a number of software standards and guidelines (“NASA Reference Documents,” 
2013)—much of the research in virtualization for space systems draws from avionics 
software guidelines (Windsor et al., 2011). The commercial avionics industry pioneered 
the idea of integrated modular avionics because of its potential to reduce costs and 
increase revenue and it has been successfully tested and deployed in a number of 
commercial aircraft (Prisaznuk, 2008). The space industry is drawing from the success of 
IMA and hardware consolidation using guidelines developed by the avionics industry to 
develop its own IMA architectures. In this section, we discuss existing standards and 
guidelines for the space industry, as well as relevant guidelines from the avionics 
industry.  
1. DOD Standards  
MIL-STD-498 is a U.S. military standard pertaining to software development 
released in 1994 (DOD, 1994). In 2008, it was largely superseded by IEEE 12207 
(Moore, 1998), an international standard pertaining to the software life cycle process. It 
includes guidance involving the processes, activities and tasks included during the 
acquisition, service, supply, development, operation and maintenance of software 
products. It is intended for software acquisitions personnel, suppliers, developers, 
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 operators, maintainers, managers and users of the software. IEEE 12207 is listed as a 
required standard for NASA mission-critical software (“NASA Software Guidelines,” 
n.d). 
DOD Instruction 8581.01 (DOD, 2010) is the DOD’s information assurance 
policy for space systems. The instruction applies to all DOD space systems and space 
system components used to receive, store, process, display or transmit classified and 
unclassified data. The instruction lists information assurance directives with which DOD 
systems must comply and also mandates that information assurance requirements for 
software used in DOD systems be validated through the applicable military department.  
a. IEEE 1228 and NASA-STD-8719.13B  
IEEE 1228 is an international standard published in 1994 pertaining to software 
safety plans. IEEE 1228 is cited in NASA’s own standard for software safety, NASA-
STD-8719.13B, as an optional standard that can be used as an additional template when 
developing a software safety plan. NASA-STD-8719.13B is a NASA-specific technical 
standard, published in 2004. NASA-STD-8719.13B outlines software safety requirements 
for all NASA projects and details how to guarantee safety is built into software developed 
or acquired by NASA (NASA, 2004b). This standard applies to all COTS software, 
stating that all COTS software used in safety-critical systems needs to be thoroughly 
analyzed and evaluated. Interfaces to developed code, extra functionality, the ability to 
meet safety functions and the interaction of the software with other parts of the system 
need to be tested (NASA, 2004b, p. 28). 
b. DO-178B 
DO-178B, titled “Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment 
Certification,” is primarily used by the Federal Aviation Administration but is sited 
extensively by NASA and others proposing virtualization architectures and real-time 
operating environments for space (Beus-Dukic, 2001; Vanderleest, 2013). DO-178B is 
not a mandatory standard but, rather, a set of guidelines to ensure the software used in 
airborne systems complies with airworthiness certification requirements. It is used in the 
international Avionics industry as the basis for software certification for commercial 
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 aircraft (Nelson, 2003). DO-178B identifies five different design assurance levels 
(DALs), A through E, each representing the severity level of a software function. For 
example, the highest severity is level A and represents software that, if it fails, could 
cause the entire system to go into a failure state. The standard also identifies a total of 65 
objectives for the software being tested. The set of objectives relevant to the software 
under test depends on its DAL rating (Rushby, 2011). 
c. ARINC-653 
ARINC-653 is a specification developed by the private entity Aeronautical Radio, 
Incorporated. This standard is used throughout the avionics industry and is gaining 
recognition in the space industry (ARINC Standards Store, n.d.; Rufino & Craveiro, 
2008). ARINC-653 specifies a standardized interface between an RTOS and its 
applications (Diniz & Rufino, 2005) and defines a set of functional and certification 
requirements meant to ensure safety (Rufino & Craveiro, 2008). ARINC-653 is tightly 
connected to the concept of IMA since it is based on strict spatial and temporal 
partitioning rules. Spatial partitioning means that partitions have separate address spaces, 
which cannot be accessed directly by other partitions. Temporal partitioning means that 
only one application has access to system resources at any given time (Schoofs, Santos, 
Tatibana, & Anjos, 2009). Figure 1 illustrates the design of a system based on the 
ARINC-653 specification.  
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Figure 1.  Example Application of the ARINC-653 Specification (from “ARINC 
653,” 2008) 
At the heart of the ARINC-653 specification are two main concepts: the partition 
and the applications/executive (APEX) layer. The partition is intended to be a container 
for applications running on the operating system, ensuring applications are separated 
spatially and temporally from one another to avoid fault propagation (Gomes, 2012). 
Partitions can also be used for system services not available through the APEX interface, 
like fault management or device drivers (Samolej, 2011).  
The APEX interface is a standardized application program interface (API) for 
services available to partitions. This enables hardware to be designed independently of 
software and allows software to be developed for ARINC-653 partitions, agnostic to the 
hardware providing this environment (Gomes, 2012). This increases the portability, 
reusability and modularity of systems, which are all goals of the IMA construct (“ARINC 
653,” 2008). The APEX has 51 routines that handle the following key functionalities: 
process management, time management, partition management, inter-partition and intra-
partition communication management, and health monitoring (“ARINC 653,” 2008). 
These functionalities enable each partition to manage its own tasks and processes. 
Communication across partitions is provided through requests to the operating system via 
the APEX API (Gomes, 2012). The APEX does not provide memory management 
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 services; instead, it assumes memory is statically allocated to partitions at configuration 
time (Samolej, 2011). 
Partitions consist of one or more processes, scheduled according to their priority. 
Process scheduling is based on the scheduling algorithm determined at configuration time 
(Han & Jin, 2011). Inter-partition communication is handled through the use of queuing 
and sampling port communication units, which are objects defined at system integration. 
Sampling ports allow a partition to access a sampling communication channel, in which 
messages are not stored but, rather, the most recent message overwrites any previous one. 
In contrast, queuing ports allow messages to be queued rather than over-written. Ports are 
connected via channels when the partitions are integrated, as defined in a configuration 
file. Intra-partition communication is handled using semaphores, blackboards and 
buffers; blackboards are similar to sampling ports, and buffers are similar to queues 
(Diniz & Rufino, 2005). The health monitor is a facility that monitors the hardware, OS 
and applications. The monitor can isolate faults by taking an action (such as restarting a 
partition) and prevent failures from propagating through the system (Samolej, 2011). The 
health monitor is meant to identify and manage errors within the system at the process 
level, the partition level or the module level. Errors are managed through the use of 
procedures defined by the system developer (Samolej, 2011). 
D. VIRTUALIZATION BACKGROUND 
In this section, we review definitions associated with virtualization and describe 
common architectures used to implement virtualization. The DOD’s Enterprise Software 
Initiative defines virtualization as “the separation of a computer operating system’s 
service request from the underlying physical delivery of that service by the hardware” 
(DOD ESI, n.d.). Tavernes et al. claim that virtualization can be implemented through 
three primary methods: hypervisor-based, microkernel-based and microvisor-based 
(Tavares et al., 2012). In this section, we first review the hypervisor approach, with 
examples of its implementation. We then briefly describe the microkernel and microvisor 
concepts. 
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 1. Hypervisor Terminology 
The term virtualization refers to the idea of creating a software environment on 
which multiple programs or operating systems can run, as if they were running on native 
hardware (Iqbal, Sadeque, & Mutia, 2009). This software environment is an abstraction 
layer that maps a hosted (guest) system’s interface and resources onto an underlying 
interface and resources, belonging to a different “real” (host) system (Smith & Nair, 
2005). The term commonly used to refer to this software abstraction layer is the virtual 
machine monitor (VMM) or hypervisor. The hypervisor acts as mediator between a host 
system’s hardware and the various guest environments running on the hypervisor, called 
virtual machines (VMs). VMs are isolated from one another, coordinated in their 
resource use by the underlying hypervisor (Chiueh & Brook, 2005). 
Popek and Goldberg (1974) define two primary types of hypervisors: type-1 (or 
native) and type-2 (or hosted). Type-1 hypervisors run directly above the host system’s 
hardware and provide all VM resources. Type-2 hypervisors operate on top of a host 
environment and are dependent on this underlying OS for maintenance and distribution of 
resources. For example, type-2 hypervisors cannot boot until the host operating system 
has booted and, in the event the host operating system crashes, so too does the type-2 
hypervisor (Jones, 2010). Figure 2 illustrates type-1 and type-2 hypervisors.  
 
Figure 2.  Example Type-1 and Type-2 Hypervisors (from Baliyase, 2014) 
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 2. Full Virtualization Architectures  
Full virtualization, illustrated in Figure 3, allows different operating systems to 
run unmodified on either type-1 (e.g., VMware ESXi) or type-2 (e.g., VMware 
Workstation) hypervisors. The hypervisor emulates the host platform, such that the VM 
and its applications run without any modification and without knowing that they are 
running on a virtualized platform (Jones, 2010). The hypervisor is responsible for 
emulating devices with which the VMs interact, providing VMs access to virtual 
hardware devices. When a VM wants to interact with a virtual device, requests from the 
VM are handled by the hypervisor (Kirch, 2007). The hypervisor, in turn, interacts with 
the hardware via a host operating system driver (for type-2 hypervisors) or a hypervisor 
driver (for type-1 hypervisors) (Sahoo, Mohapatra, & Lath, 2010). 
In full virtualization binary translation converts privileged machine code from the 
VM to the hardware. Binary translation is a process whereby the hypervisor scans a 
VM’s memory for privileged instructions before they are executed, and dynamically 
modifies these into code that the hypervisor can emulate for the hardware (Binu & 
Kumar, 2011). Full virtualization tends to have high overhead due to the need to translate 
machine code, and the frequency of traps between the VM and the hypervisor (Jeong, 
2013). 
 
Figure 3.  Example of Full Virtualization (from Jeong, 2013) 
3. Paravirtualization Architectures 
Paravirtualization differs from full virtualization in the way communication 
between the VMs and devices is handled. In full virtualization, the hypervisor fully 
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 emulates devices and translates privileged instructions without the guest OS being 
modified; in paravirtualization, the guest OS has been modified to run virtualized. This 
modification allows the VM to relay instructions through the hypervisor without 
requiring that the hypervisor first translate them. For example, paravirtualization, 
illustrated in Figure 4, can be implemented using a privileged VM to handle input/output 
(I/O) requests from other guest VMs. The privileged VM is equipped with a “back-end” 
driver that can access the hardware, while the other VMs are equipped with “front-end” 
drivers (Binu & Kumar, 2011). When a VM wants to execute an I/O instruction, it uses 
its front-end driver proxies to relay the instruction to the back-end driver. The hypervisor 
does not need to scan for privileged instructions during operation; instead, the 
paravirtualized guest has been modified to send requests to the back-end driver.  
 
Figure 4.  Implementation of Paravirtualization (from Binu & Kumar, 2011) 
The modified instructions used by paravirtualized guest OSs are called hypercalls. 
Hypercalls are software traps from the VM’s virtual driver to the hypervisor (LeVasseur 
et al., 2005; “Xen Hypercall,” n.d.). Paravirtualization tends to be simpler and faster than 
full virtualization but has considerable engineering cost, since each guest OS is modified 
to be aware that it does not run on native hardware (Barham et al., 2003). 
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 4. Software Emulation Architectures 
Emulation is a process whereby the physical hardware platform, such as ARM or 
PowerPC, is emulated by the hypervisor (Murphy, n.d.) as illustrated in Figure 5. Here, 
the hypervisor emulates different instances of hardware, such as the processor and I/O 
devices, used by separate VMs. The hypervisor translates the instruction set architectures 
(ISA) of an emulated processor into the ISA of the underlying platform. In software 
emulation, every instruction issued by the VM is interpreted by the emulator layer 
(Chiueh & Brook, 2005; Jones, 2010). 
 
Figure 5.  An Illustration of the Emulation Concept (from Jones, 2011). 
5. Hardware-Assisted Virtualization Architectures 
Hardware-assisted virtualization refers to changes that have been made directly 
in hardware to better accommodate virtualization. With hardware-assisted virtualization, 
extensions have been added to CPUs and their ISAs so that certain virtualization 
procedures, such as binary translation or paravirtualization via hypercalls, are 
unnecessary. Instead, privileged instructions can be trapped and emulated by the 
hardware directly, instead of by the hypervisor (Jones, 2010; “Understanding Full 
Virtualization,” 2007).  
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 6. Example Architectures 
In this section, we review the landscape of virtualization technologies. We discuss 
five well-known virtualization products—VMWare Workstation, Xen, Qemu, KVM and 
VMWare ESXi—employing these as points-of-comparison in our survey, later. 
a. VMWare Workstation 
VMWare Workstation is VMWare’s full virtualization architecture, designed to 
run on individual PCs. VMWare Workstation runs as a type-2 hypervisor and is designed 
to work with x86 host systems. When VMWare Workstation is installed, three 
components are created: the VM Driver, the VMM and the VMWare Application or 
VMApp (see Figure 6). Both the VMM and the VM Driver operate at the same privilege 
level as the host OS, while the VMApp runs at the level of the guest VM (above the 
VMM). The VMM is an application running on the host OS. When a user executes the 
VMApp, it works with the VMDriver to load the VMM into the host’s kernel memory. 
Once loaded, the host operating system is only cognizant of the application and the driver 
and not the VMM. The VMM communicates directly with the hardware, and the host 
operating system via the VMDriver (Munro, 2001). 
 
Figure 6.  VMWare Workstation Architecture (from Munro, 2001). 
Non-privileged instructions executed on the guest OS are sent through the VMM 
directly to the host system to be processed. Privileged instructions, however, are trapped 
by the VMM and translated via binary translation. The VMDriver then facilitates a 
transfer so that the VMM can communicate with the host OS. Once in the “host world,” 
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 the VMApp-translated instructions are communicated via the VMApp to the host OS, 
which executes the instruction (Rosenblum & Garfinkel, 2005; Chiueh & Brook, 2005; 
USENIX, 2001). 
b. XEN 
Xen, illustrated in Figure 7, is an open-source, type-1 hypervisor for x86 
platforms that utilizes paravirtualization but also supports full virtualization and 
hardware-assisted virtualization. Xen operates directly on top of the host hardware, in a 
higher privilege level than all but one of its VMs. The Xen hypervisor creates a 
distinguished VM at boot time, the Domain 0 or Dom0 VM, which is privileged and 
responsible for various management tasks (see Figure 7). The Dom0 VM, through its 
ability to interact directly with host hardware and provide interfaces for other VMs, is 
able: to create and kill other VMs, to control their physical memory allocations, to control 
a VM’s access to various underlying physical resources, such as the hard disk and shared 
network devices, and to manage the I/O of each VM. The Dom0 VM is the only domain 
that is able to access the hardware directly (“DomU,” n.d.). 
 
Figure 7.  Xen Architecture (from “Virtualization,” 2013) 
To more efficiently handle privileged instructions from a guest OS instance to the 
VMM, Xen requires that each paravirtualized guest OS is modified so that privileged 
instructions are replaced with calls to the Xen hypervisor. VMs communicate directly 
with the Xen hypervisor through hypercalls to perform privileged operations (Barham et 
al., 2003; Binu & Kumar, 2011). 
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 c. QEMU 
Qemu is a software-based hardware emulator that can run multiple instances of 
itself on top of a host operating system. Each instance of Qemu can be viewed as a 
hypervisor, emulating a system (see Figure 8). Qemu is capable of emulating several 
different CPUs, including x86, PowerPC, ARM and SPARC. Qemu consists of several 
subsystems, including a CPU emulator, emulated devices (VGA display, the mouse, 
keyboard, network card), a user interface and a debugger. These subsystems allow for the 
complete simulation of an unmodified guest running on top of emulated hardware.  
 
Figure 8.  Qemu Architecture (from Hussein, 2009) 
Emulation in Qemu is carried out using a process called dynamic binary 
translation, to translate guest CPU instructions into host instructions. Translation occurs 
at runtime and the result is stored in a fixed-size cache for reuse later. By using a cache, 
frequent instructions do not need to be translated multiple times. The process by which 
frequently used instructions are saved for reuse, to avoid translation overhead, is called 
dynamic recompilation (Landley, 2009). There are several steps in Qemu’s dynamic 
translation process. First, guest instructions are broken into “micro operations.” The 
purpose of this is to simplify the translation logic, allowing for repeated use of translated 
micro-operations. Each micro operation is implemented individually, written in C and 
compiled by GCC to create native, object files. The object files are used by Qemu’s 
dyngen utility, a compile time tool that uses the object file as input to a dynamic code 
generator. The code generator is invoked at runtime to create the machine code used by 
the host (Bellard, 2005; Chiueh & Brooks, 2005). 
 18 
 d. KVM 
Kernel virtual machine (KVM) is an open-source, hardware-assisted virtualization 
architecture that supports paravirtualization (see Figure 9). KVM requires Intel VT-X or 
AMD-V enabled CPUs and makes use of their CPU extensions (Habib, 2008). The KVM 
VMM is essentially a modified Linux kernel module designed to operate as a hypervisor. 
Each VM running on KVM is a Linux process, which can be managed like any normal 
Linux process. Whereas normal Linux processes operate in either user mode or kernel 
mode, KVM enables a third “guest mode.” Processes in guest mode run from within the 
KVM VM (Habib, 2008). Since each VM is a Linux process, they can leverage all the 
features available within the Linux kernel. For example, SELinux and sVirt can be 
employed to implement security features to constrain KVM VMs (processes). KVM VMs 
use Qemu for I/O (Qemu, n.d.), which is employed as a user-space process inside the VM 
(Habib, 2008). Memory for each VM can be shared by using the Kernel same-page 
merging (KSM) feature, which scans each VM’s memory space and consolidates 
identical memory pages (Zhang et al., 2010). 
 
Figure 9.  KVM Architecture (from Virtualization Station, 2008) 
e. VMware ESXi 
VMware ESXi is a type-1 hypervisor (vSphere ESXi, n.d.). The primary 
component of VMware ESXi is the VMKernel (see Figure 10). This controls all 
interaction with the hardware, and is designed with the sole purpose of managing and 
controlling the VMs. In addition to the VMs that run above VMKernel, several processes 
also run on top of the VMKernel to help with VM management. One of these processes is 
a VMM process, which provides the execution environment for the guest operating 
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 system running within each VM. There is one VMM instance per VM. The VMM 
process is an intermediary process allowing guests to interact with the resources 
controlled by the VMKernel (Mishchenko, 2010). Each instance of the VMM process 
utilizes a helper process, called the VMX, which handles I/O to non-critical devices and 
communicates with the user interfaces and remote consoles (“VMWare Knowledge 
Base,” n.d.). Additional processes that run above the VMKernel are the Direct Console 
User Interface (DCUI) and the Common Information Model (CIM) server. The DCUI is a 
low-level management interface used for initial configuration of the ESXi hypervisor. 
The CIM server enables remote monitoring of the ESXi server and the VMs it manages, 
implementing a standard CIM API for remote CIM clients (Fujitsu, 2010). 
 
Figure 10.  ESXi Architecture (from “The Architecture,” n.d.). 
7. Microkernel and Microvisor 
A microkernel is a small software layer over hardware, providing services to 
processes and operating systems in a less privileged domain (“Microkernel Architecture,” 
n.d.; Douglas, 2010). A hypervisor’s main responsibility is to implement virtual machines 
that run at a lower privilege level than the hypervisor; in contrast, a microkernel is a 
small base on which other systems can be built (General Dynamics, 2008). In particular, 
a hypervisor may be implemented on top of a microkernel.  
Armand and Gien suggest that the use of microkernels is motivated by the 
increasing complexity of operating systems (Armand, 2009). Microkernels are well suited 
for use in embedded systems, which are often not designed to support a full-featured, 
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 monolithic kernel. Microkernels allow systems to be designed in less complex ways and 
in a more modular fashion since less functionality is included at the kernel level 
(Armand, 2009). Security is another motivation for the development of microkernels. 
Iqbal et al. observe that microkernels support the principle of least privilege: 
functionalities at higher privilege levels are as limited as possible (Iqbal et al., 2009). 
Only essential tasks, such as low-level address space management, thread management 
and inter-process communication are handled by the microkernel.  
The term “microvisor” is used to refer to a microkernel that supports 
virtualization (Iqbal et al., 2009; General Dynamics, n.d.). The term first appears in 
reference to the OKL4 microvisor in 2010. The OKL4 microvisor is designed to support 
both full operating systems, as well as applications, and can support real-time and non-
real-time software (Heiser &Leslie, 2010). Next, we discuss the real-time operating 
systems that can be used in space systems.  
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 III. REAL-TIME OPERATING SYSTEMS FOR SPACE 
In this chapter, we survey real-time operating systems currently being used or 
proposed for use in the space domain. We discuss how each RTOS is used in space and 
review the high-level design of the operating system, task or process management, 
scheduling and memory management. We then discuss the compatibility of each RTOS 
with virtualization architectures, its compliance with space standards and offer an 
analysis of its use in space system development.  
A. SCOPE 
The purpose of our survey work is to review fundamental RTOS designs and 
identify different methods of implementing key functionalities (see Table 2). Some 
RTOSs have been excluded from this study, due to lack of industry adoption or lack of 
available system information. This includes eCos (“Home Page,” n.d.), ThreadX 
(“ThreadX,” n.d.), Wind River Linux (“Wind River Linux,” n.d.), QNX (QNX, n.d.), 
Deos, HeartDeos (“A Time,” n.d.), and Salvo (“Welcome,” n.d.). Table 2 summarizes the 





Table 2.   RTOS Attributes Chart 
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1 The term “task” refers to the basic unit of execution for an RTOS. 
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2 LXRT is an RTAI module that allows real-time tasks to be developed and run in user space. LXRT processes can be migrated to kernel space.  
3 Primary mode is equivalent to kernel mode and secondary mode is equivalent to user mode. 
4 See “VxWorks” section where RTPs are discussed. 
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 B. VXWORKS  
VxWorks is a proprietary suite of software products designed for embedded 
systems with real-time requirements. VxWorks is developed and maintained by Wind 
River Systems. Wind River offers software “platforms” tailored in different ways for 
specific industries, such as aerospace (“6.9 Platform,” n.d.); for certain architectures, 
such as MILS and ARINC653 (“MILS Platform,” n.d.; Parkinson, n.d.); or for certain 
certifications, such as DO-178B (“Cert Platform,” n.d.). These platforms all include the 
VxWorks Operating System, a development environment called the VxWorks 
Workbench, and optional middleware based on the platform. Both the MILS platform and 
the ARINC653 platform include modified versions of the standard VxWorks Operating 
System. VxWorks is compatible with over 124 different processors (“Board Support 
Packages,” n.d.) including the MIPS and PowerPC processor families. VxWorks has its 
own API but is also fully POSIX compliant.5 VxWorks provides an IPv4/IPv6 network 
stack that has undergone third party testing and validation to ensure high performance 
(“6.9 Platform,” n.d.). This network stack was cited as being a key factor in the ESA’s 
use of VxWorks on the European Geostationary Navigational Overlay System, a 
navigational space satellite mission (Parkinson, n.d.).  
Over the past 20 years, NASA has used VxWorks in a number of its missions 
(“VxWorks Space,” n.d.). VxWorks 5.3.1 was used on a MIPS processor by the Mars 
Exploration Rover (“VxWorks,” n.d.). Other versions of the operating system are being 
used on other missions including the Cygnus Spacecraft, an unmanned cargo transport 
vessel where VxWorks is running on the main flight computer (“Genesis,” n.d.). 
VxWorks is also being used to control the flight computer of the MESSENGER probe, an 
unmanned spacecraft orbiting Mercury (“Messenger,” n.d.; “VxWorks Space,” n.d.). 
SpaceX, the private space travel company, uses an unspecified VxWorks platform on its 
Dragon reusable spacecraft (“SpaceX,” n.d.).  
5 Supports the 1003.1 standard but does not provide process creation capability with fork() or exec() or 
file ownership and file permissions. 
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 The VxWorks operating system is tightly coupled with the additional software 
products designed for embedded systems that Wind River offers. As such, the operating 
system is compatible with the Wind River Hypervisor. VxWorks can also run as an 
unmodified guest operating system on the Green Hills Multivisor (“Integrity Multivisor,” 
n.d.). 
Wind River offers a suite of highly customizable and modular software products 
with different design features based on the certifications or architectures required. As 
such, there is no set of standards with which the core VxWorks operating system alone 
complies. Wind River offers separate products, such as VxWorks653 that complies with 
the ARINC-653 specification, and the VxWorks CERT platform that complies with the 
DO-178 standard (“Profiles,” n.d.). 
1. Design 
Conceptually, VxWorks reflects the “process model” similar to UNIX and Linux, 
whereby kernel space and user space are clearly delineated and the applications that run 
in these two spaces run at different privilege levels (“6.9 Guide,” n.d.). VxWorks can be 
configured as a micro-kernel, a basic kernel or as a full-featured operating system. It is 
unclear which versions of the operating system are commonly used in spacecraft but 
documentation does confirm that VxWorks has been used in space systems of different 
sizes, such as microsatellites (Teston, Vuilleumier, Hardy, & Bernaerts, 2004) and 
unmanned spacecraft (“CIRA,” n.d.), which might indicate the use of different VxWorks 
configurations in space systems. Figure 11 illustrates the various capabilities included in 




Figure 11.  VxWorks Kernel Scale Options (from “6.9 Guide,” n.d.) 
a. Task Management 
The basic unit of execution in VxWorks is a thread, which VxWorks refers to as a 
task. VxWorks refers to processes as Real-Time Processes or RTPs, which are a 
collection of tasks grouped by function. Support for RTPs is an optional configuration in 
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 VxWorks. If RTPs are supported then tasks within RTPs run in user mode. If RTPs are 
not supported then VxWorks tasks run at the highest privilege on the processor6 
(“VxWorks Architecture,” 2005).  
b. Scheduling Management 
VxWorks supports three types of task schedulers, listed in Table 3. For all 
schedulers, the default scheduling option is priority-based preemptive scheduling in 
which a higher priority task can preempt a lower priority task to run. 
Table 3.   VxWorks Supported Schedulers (from “6.9 Guide,” n.d., p. 138) 
Task Scheduler Use 
Traditional VxWorks Scheduler Scheduling policy enforced across the 
system (kernel and user mode) with either a 
priority-based, preemptive policy or a 
round-robin policy 
POSIX Thread Scheduler Schedules POSIX threads (pthreads) within 
real-time processes and applies scheduling 
policies on a thread-by-thread basis 
Custom Scheduler Developer can define own scheduler 
 
c. Memory Management 
VxWorks supports memory protection on processors with or without MMUs. 
RTPs have their own region of virtual address space that is not shared with any other 
process; this allows memory to remain isolated if VxWorks is running on a processor that 
does not have an MMU (“6.9 Guide,” n.d.).  
VxWorks also offers a proprietary mapping facility called sdLib, which enables 
RTP applications to share memory through a shared data region. Once established, user-
mode applications and kernel tasks have access to these shared data regions (“6.9 Guide,” 
n.d., p. 66).  
6 This applies to ARM, Intel and SuperH processors. On MIPS processors, if RTPs are not supported, 
tasks run in kernel mode. 
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 2. Analysis 
VxWorks is a legacy RTOS that has proven its ability to perform on space 
missions for a number of years. Reliability is a major decision factor for use in space 
systems given the time and money involved in validating a new system. Space system 
developers tend to choose VxWorks due to its proven reputation on high profile space 
missions (“CIRA, n.d.; Volpe et al., 2000, p. 30).  
VxWorks is a modular RTOS that can be configured in various ways depending 
on the processor on which it runs and the applications it hosts. This is evident in the 
different options available for task management, scheduling and memory management. 
Flexible configuration options are another factor that space system developers cite as 
being essential when choosing an RTOS to use for space system development (Beus-
Deukic, 2001). 
VxWorks also offers a familiar development environment, which NASA’s Joint 
Propulsion Laboratory cited as being a factor in the Mars Curiosity Rover mission 
success. The VxWorks programming interface that is similar to UNIX, and its POSIX 
compatibility helped NASA developers develop and debug during development since 
their work took less time and existing code could be reused (“NASA’s Mars,” n.d.). 
C. REAL-TIME LINUX 
There are several projects dedicated to making Linux capable of handling real-
time requirements (“Introduction to Linux,” 2002). These projects offer different 
solutions to making Linux an RTOS. One approach taken by the RTLinux, Xenomai and 
RTAI projects is to develop a software layer below the Linux kernel that handles real-
time requirements. A second approach, taken by the CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT 
community (“Real-Time Linux Wiki,” n.d.), is to improve the existing Linux kernel to 
meet real-time requirements with the PREEMPT_RT patch (McKenney, 2005; 
Opdenacker, 2004; Clark, 2013). Each version of real-time Linux comes in the form of a 
patch to the standard Linux kernel. With this approach, the portability of these RTOSs to 
various hypervisors is comparable to main line Linux.  
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 To the best of our knowledge, the different implementations of real-time Linux 
run on all of the virtualization architectures surveyed in this thesis. The implementations 
of real-time Linux do not comply with any space standards and the developers are open 
about the fact that there are no guarantees with the real-time Linux code.  
In 1999, NASA initiated a project called FlightLinux to assess Linux’s readiness 
for space systems. Though the program ended in 2002, many advantages to Linux’s use 
in space were identified, including the ease of developing applications required for 
missions and the relative ease of developing features, such as adding fault tolerance into 
the existing software (Katz & Some, 2003). Since the FlightLinux project, Linux has 
been used in a number of space missions (Edge, 2013; “Five Ways NASA,” n.d.). 
RTLinux was used in a hurricane data system for NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center. 
In this project, RTLinux was responsible for aircraft attitude correction and a number of 
other tasks related to data collection (Wright & Walsh, 1999). RTAI is currently being 
used by NASA’s McDonald Laser Ranging Station for its range control activities, 
including locating satellites in orbit (Ricklefs, n.d.). Xenomai is used by NASA’s robotics 
developers to develop a robotic machine to perform tasks in space (Krüger, Schiele, & 
Hambuchen, 2013).  
In a 2013 presentation, Keven Scharpf of the PTR group cited the PREEMPT_RT 
patch as a viable solution to hard-real-time requirements for space systems. The PTR 
group has worked on a number of space missions, including the Tacsat-2 microsatellite 
mission, which was the first mission to use Linux in space (Scharpf, 2013). Wind River 
also makes use of the PREEMPT_RT patch in its WindRiver Linux 4 and 6 products 
(“Wind River Linux 4,” n.d.; “Wind River Linux 6,” n.d.). 
1. RTLinux, Xenomai, and RTAI 
RTLinux, Xenomai, and RTAI are all designed as “dual kernel” configurations. 
These operating systems have some minor differences, but their fundamental approach to 
making Linux real-time is the same. We will focus on the architecture of RTLinux for the 
remainder of this section.  
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 In RTLinux (see Figure 12), a microkernel extension is added to the Linux kernel 
(Opdenacker, 2004). This extension is a set of Linux kernel modules that deal specifically 
with real-time tasks by providing a subset of the POSIX API (“RTLinux,” n.d.). With this 
alteration to the standard Linux kernel, a second real-time microkernel, i.e., RTLinux 
Kernel, is placed under the standard Linux kernel, which runs as an idle task on top of the 
RTLinux Kernel (Balasubramaniam, n.d.). Real-time applications are created as modules 
that run on the RTLinux Kernel and are written using a subset of the POSIX API, based 
on the POSIX Minimal Realtime System Profile, or PSE51 (Terrasa, Garcia-Fornes, & 
Espinosa, 2002).  
 
Figure 12.  Illustration of RTLinux Design (from Balasubramaniam, n.d.)  
a. Task Management 
All real-time tasks run at kernel privilege level and have direct access to the 
hardware. All interrupts are intercepted by the RT-microkernel, which decides what to 
do. If these interrupts have real-time handlers, then the RT-microkernel schedules them 
first (Yodaiken, 1999).  
b. Scheduling Management 
The RT-microkernel has its own scheduler that is responsible for scheduling both 
real-time and non-real-time tasks (Yodaiken, 2001). This scheduler is generally a 
preemptive priority based scheduler with tasks having their priority statically determined.  
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 c. Memory Management 
In RTLinux and Xenomai, real-time tasks are allocated fixed amounts of memory 
for data and code (Balasubramaniam, n.d.) and do not use virtual memory (Yodaiken, 
2001). RTAI on the other hand, uses dynamic memory allocation (Balasubramaniam, 
n.d.). For all three dual-kernel configurations of Linux, the real-time applications running 
on top of the RT-microkernel share a common address space (Haas, n.d.). 
2. PREEMPT_RT  
The PREEMPT_RT patch (see Figure 13) makes the Linux kernel fully pre-
emptible through optimizations inside the kernel. The patch is sometimes referred to as 
RT-PREEMPT, PREEMPT-RT, CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT or CONFIG_PREEMPT 
(“Real-Time Linux Wiki,” n.d.). Unlike RTLinux, RTAI and Xenomai, PREEMPT_RT 
does not include a separate kernel to handle real-time tasks. The goal of the 
PREEMPT_RT project is to make the existing Linux kernel 100% pre-emptible (Rostedt 
& Hart, 2007, pp. 161–172).  
 
Figure 13.  Illustration of PREEMPT_RT Modification to Linux Kernel (from 
Jones, 2008) 
a. Design 
The PREEMPT_RT patch allows the Linux kernel to become a predictable and 
deterministic operating system (Rostedt & Hart, 2007). This is done by doing two things: 
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 using threads to service selected device interrupts and replacing existing spin locks with 
mutexes that are preemptive and support priority inheritance (Fayyad-Kazan, 2014).  
b. Task Management 
Using separate threads to service device interrupts reduces interrupt latencies, 
allowing a higher priority task to not be significantly affected by a lower priority task, 
which causes heavy I/O interrupts (Rostedt & Hart, 2007). Mutexes in the 
PREEMPT_RT patch prioritize the tasks waiting for the resource (Moore, 2005).  
c. Scheduling Management 
The PREEMPT_RT patch does not include any modification to the schedulers 
already available in the standard Linux kernel.  
d. Memory Management 
The PREEMPT_RT patch does not include any additional memory management 
functionalities that are not already in use in the standard Linux kernel.  
3. Analysis 
There is a lot of discussion within the space community regarding Linux’s 
suitability for space systems. Prieto et al. (2004) cite a number of reasons why Linux is 
an attractive operating system for space. One factor is the time that can be saved in 
testing and debugging since developers are very familiar with the software environment. 
Another reason Linux is attractive is because the development platform for building 
applications can mirror the actual software environment in space. The open source 
community’s involvement in software debugging and problem solving is also a resource 
that Prieto claims can be incredibly helpful (Prieto et al., 2004).  
The Naval Research Laboratory cited that Linux was used on its TacSat-1 
spacecraft, primarily because accessibility to source code was vital for debugging 
purposes and because of the ease of migrating development software on x86 platforms to 
the actual PowerPC space processor. The TacSat-1, however, did not have any hard real-
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 time requirements, which was a reason why NRL chose Linux as opposed to a 
proprietary RTOS like VxWorks (Huffine, 2005).  
Linux is an attractive operating system for space systems given its widespread use 
and legacy reliability in terrestrial systems. The real-time Linux projects surveyed offer 
features like task prioritization and bounded latencies that provide useful determinism for 
space systems. The projects however, have not been certified to any space standard and 
the developers make no guarantee that the real-time Linux projects are suitable for hard 
real-time systems. Key safety features like memory protection or static scheduling 
policies (in PREEMPT_RT) are only as good as the standard kernel.  
D. GREEN HILLS INTEGRITY-178B 
INTEGRITY-178B is a proprietary, ARINC-653 compliant, DO-178B Level A 
certified RTOS developed and maintained by Green Hills Software. The INTEGRITY 
178B separation kernel was certified to be compliant to the Separation Kernel Protection 
Profile under the U.S. Common Criteria evaluation scheme (Green Hills, 2008).  
It is unclear from published literature what hypervisors INTEGRITY-178B can 
run on as a guest. Green Hills Software has a virtualization platform called INTEGRITY-
Multivisor (see Chapter IV). In no descriptions of this platform is INTEGRITY-178B 
mentioned as a possible guest VM (“Integrity Multivisor,” n.d.).  
NASA selected INTEGRITY-178B to operate the flight control module and the 
backup emergency controller on the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle, a space vessel 
designed to carry astronauts to the moon. NASA chose INTEGRITY-178B since it was 
considered the most mature RTOS and was the most cost-effective (“NASA’s Orion,” 
2008). INTEGRITY-178B is also used on NASA’s Pad Abort Demonstrator, a test bed 
platform meant to evaluate emergency abort scenarios for spacecraft crewmembers on the 
International Space Station (“Green Hills Software,” 2003; “Pad Abort,” 2003). 
1. Design  
Green Hills INTEGRITY-178B’s design is based on a secure separation 
architecture, which implements five different principles: minimal implementation, 
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 componentization, least privilege, secure development process and independent expert 
validation (“Secure Separation,” n.d.). The INTEGRITY-178B separation kernel (see 
Figure 14) separates resources into partitions and isolates these partitions from one 
another. Applications of different criticality level can run within these partitions and the 
kernel ensures that a lower priority application cannot interfere with a higher priority 
application.  
 
Figure 14.  INTEGRITY-178B Design (from “Safety Critical Products,” n.d.) 
a. Task Management 
INTEGRITY-178B is an object-oriented OS, meaning that the various 
functionalities are treated as objects as opposed to actions. The core objects supported by 
INTEGRITY-178B and their purpose are listed in Table 4. Each task (subject) is 
associated with a single AddressSpace, which is a block of memory addresses.  
Table 4.   INTEGRITY-178B Objects 
OBJECT PURPOSE HOW DEFINED 
AddressSpace Defines a partition; supports 
task management 
Statically 
Task Task management Statically 
MemoryRegion Memory management Statically 
Link Access management Statically 
IODevice I/O management Statically 
Connection Synchronous and asynchronous 
communications 
Statically 
Activity Task management; 
asynchronous communications 
Statically or dynamically 
Semphore Task synchronization Statically or dynamically 
Clock Time Management Statically or dynamically 
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 All tasks associated with a partition (i.e., an AddressSpace) have an identifier that 
links it to its AddressSpace. This task identifier is used for authentication purposes. The 
task identifier is used to enforce authorized information flow and resource sharing. Tasks 
within a partition can freely access resources allocated to the partition, but if a task tries 
to access resources from a different partition, the task will be terminated. Access policies 
for each AddressSpace are defined at configuration time.  
b. Scheduling Management 
The INTEGRITY-178B scheduler manages the execution of the tasks allocated to 
the configured partitions. Since INTEGRITY-178B is ARINC-653 compatible, it adheres 
to a partition schedule that is statically defined. Each partition is allocated a block of time 
in which its tasks can be executed. AddressSpaces can be allocated a specific block of 
processor time or can be combined with other partitions that then share processor time.  
c. Memory Management 
The INTEGRITY kernel runs in a physical address space and leverages the 
processor MMU to manage the virtual address spaces allocated to the partitions. Each 
partition has its memory and data statically assigned. INTEGRITY does not support 
dynamic memory allocation.  
2. Analysis 
INTEGRITY-178B is the only RTOS surveyed that has a separation kernel that 
has undergone formal verification and been proven to perform at “high robustness” levels 
by the National Information Assurance Partnership evaluation scheme. Security and 
safety design considerations, such as memory protection, ARINC-653 scheduling 
compliance and access policies for tasks are built into the RTOS, which make it suitable 
for safety-critical missions. The RTOS is also a proven RTOS for space systems, given 
its use in NASA missions.  
Arguably, INTEGRITY-178B offers less in the way of flexibility than VxWorks 
or Linux. The RTOS relies on the processor MMU for memory protection so is not 
suitable for processors without an MMU, such as the ERC32 and does not support 
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 dynamic memory allocation. INTEGRITY-178B also does not have as extensive a track-
record within the space community compared to VxWorks (Cudmore, 2007).  
E. FREERTOS 
FreeRTOS is an open-source RTOS developed and maintained by the British 
company Real Time Engineers LTD. FreeRTOS is available under a modified GNU 
general public license, which allows applications developed with the FreeRTOS API to 
remain closed source (“FreeRTOS,” n.d.). SafeRTOS is another version of FreeRTOS 
developed by the company HighIntegritySystems, which is DO-178B certified (“Safety-
critical RTOS,” 2013). To our knowledge, SafeRTOS has not been deployed in any space 
systems so will only be discussed briefly. FreeRTOS is specifically tailored for 
microcontrollers and is portable to 35 different architectures, including FreeScale, x86 
and ARM. FreeRTOS uses its own API and does not support POSIX.  
FreeRTOS has been used primarily in small satellite deployments. It is an 
attractive choice because of the number of ports available for microcontrollers and 
because it is free (Holmstrøm, 2012). The private company GOMspace uses it on its 
Nanomind computer processor, which is designed to control small satellite missions 
(“NanoMind Computers,” n.d.). CubeSatShop.com advertises a flight-qualified processor 
called the ISIS on board computer that includes FreeRTOS (“The One-Stop-Shop,” n.d.). 
FreeRTOS has been used in a number of academic satellite projects including an Indian 
nanosatellite project called STUDSAT-2, which is India’s first nanosatellite project. 
FreeRTOS is used as the on board computer of STUDSAT-2 and controls the central 
workings of the satellite (Rajulu, Dasiga, & Iyer, 2014). The firm Surrey Satellite 
Technology Ltd. and the University of Surrey in England used FreeRTOS in their 
experimental nanosatellite, Strand-1, which was the first of a series of cooperative 
satellite missions aimed at technological innovation in the small satellite domain. Strand-
1 used a GomSpace on board computer, which ran FreeRTOS (Kenyon et al., 2011). 
FreeRTOS can run as a paravirtualized guest machine on the X-hyp embedded 
hypervisor (“Para Virtualized Quests for Xhyp,” n.d.). In 2014 a project to port 
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 FreeRTOS to Xen on ARM was introduced by the Oregon based company Galois 
(Daugherty, 2014).  
1. Design 
The kernel itself is only composed of three C source files: queue.c, (queue 
structures), list.c, (linked list used in the queue structure) and tasks.c (task and scheduling 
logic) (Douglas, 2010).  
a. Task Management 
Tasks are defined as basic C functions and are the unit of execution. Applications 
that run on FreeRTOS are treated as a set of independent tasks (Real Time Engineers, 
Ltd., 2014). FreeRTOS supports one to one mapping of resources to tasks through the use 
of “gatekeeper tasks,” which are tasks that have sole ownership of a resource. Only this 
task can communicate with the resource directly; other tasks needing the resource need to 
communicate with the resource’s gatekeeper (via a queue) which will then make the 
resource available. 
b. Scheduling Management 
The FreeRTOS scheduler uses a fixed priority, pre-emptive scheduling algorithm, 
but also supports a cooperative scheduling model whereby tasks are never preempted and 
tasks with the same priority do not share processing time equally. The priority assigned to 
a task is not static and can be changed by the task itself.  
c. Memory Management  
FreeRTOS applications are able to allocate memory differently, depending on 
their requirements. If tasks or other facilities such as queues or semaphores are created 
before the scheduler starts running, then memory is dynamically allocated by the kernel 
and stays allocated for the duration of the application.  
FreeRTOS supports a macro that is used to allocate protected regions on the ARM 
memory protection unit (MPU) regions, but this requires the specific port of FreeRTOS 
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 to run on processors that support an MPU such as the ARM Cortex-M3 (Real Time 
Engineers, Ltd., 2014).  
2. Analysis 
The fact that manufacturers of microprocessors for small satellites are including 
FreeRTOS on their chip sets indicates that FreeRTOS has a legacy in the small satellite 
domain (“NanoMind Computers,” n.d.). Being open-source also makes FreeRTOS an 
attractive option for missions with limited budgets. FreeRTOS is well documented and its 
core code development is maintained separately from community contributions, which 
makes revisions to the code consistent and traceable. The proprietary SafeRTOS version 
of FreeRTOS offers potential flexibility to developers who might be interested in a more 
secure version of the RTOS.  
FreeRTOS however, does not provide much in the way of security for its 
applications. The small code base of the kernel limits the potential vector for security 
breaches but protection mechanisms, such as memory protection are not consistently 
available for all versions of the RTOS. Furthermore, tasks can execute at the same 
privilege level as the kernel. 
F. LYNXOS-178  
LynxOS-178 is a DO-178B certified proprietary RTOS developed by Lynx 
Software Technologies. LynxOS-178 runs primarily on the x86 platform but also 
supports some PowerPC platforms (“Board Support,” n.d.). LynxOS-178 is not 
advertised as being completely ARINC-653 compliant since it does not support the 
ARINC-653 standard for inter-partition communications (Leiner, 2007) but it does 
incorporate some of the ARINC-653 functionalities.  
LynxOS-178 is currently being used to monitor signals and transmit navigation 
data in the ESA’s Galileo mission, a global navigation system that consists of thirty 
satellites (Howard, 2011). NASA has referenced LynxOS as a partitioning operating 
system worth studying for deployment in NASA space missions (Cudemore, 2013). 
LynxOS was used by NASA on the McDonald Laser Ranging Station to control tracking, 
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 ranging and timing starting in the early 1990s but switched to RTAI in 2011 for cost 
reasons (Ricklefs, n.d.). To the best of our knowledge, LynxOS-178 can only run as a 
guest OS on the LynxSecure Microkernel hypervisor (“LynxOS-178,” n.d.).  
1. Design  
LynxOS-178 is fully POSIX compliant and uses POSIX as its native interface 
(see Figure 15). LynxOS-178 also includes some ARINC-653 functions, such as health 
monitoring, partition management, time and process management and the ARINC-653 
API. 
  
Figure 15.  Illustration of LynxOS-178 (from “LynxOS-178,” n.d., p. 2) 
a. Task Management 
POSIX threads are the basic scheduling entity. A task in LynxOS-178 is a group 
of threads Tasks run within partitions which are spatially isolated blocks of memory 
allocated by the processor’s MMU. LynxOS-178 uses a patented approach called 
“priority tracking” to prevent priority inversion. Each task has two priority values 
associated with it, one for kernel threads and one for user threads. Kernel threads that 
handle interrupts do so “in step” with the user thread that actually requires the interrupt 
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 (“Linux Software,” n.d.). This allows kernel threads to have their priority dynamically 
changed so that they always have higher priority than user tasks (Carlgren & Ferej, n.d.).  
b. Scheduling Management 
The LynxOS scheduler is preemptive and supports FIFO, round-robin and 
priority-based quantum scheduling polices. The priority-based quantum policy is a 
proprietary scheduling policy, similar to round-robin but with dynamic time slices 
(Carlgren & Ferej, n.d.). Each partition running on LynxOS-178 is scheduled according 
to a fixed cyclic scheduling policy and is statically assigned processor time. Partitions are 
able to schedule their own tasks using priority-based preemptive scheduling. Priority 
inheritance and the priority ceiling protocol are supported to prevent priority inversion 
within a partition (Leiner, 2007).  
c. Memory Management 
LynxOS requires the processor’s MMU to do to memory protection. Neither 
memory nor resources are shared between partitions. Memory is statically allocated to 
partitions as defined in a configuration file called the virtual machine configuration table 
(VCT).  
2. Analysis 
LynxOS-178, like VxWorks and INTEGRITY-178B is safety certified and proven 
in the space domain. Unlike VxWorks and INTEGRITY-178B however, LynxOS-178 is 
limited in the number of processor families it supports, which currently consists of the 
x86, PowerPC and Pentium processors. LynxOS-178, like INTEGRITY-178B, also 
requires the use of a MMU for memory management and does not provide support for 
processors without an MMU. LynxOS-178’s POSIX compliance and support of multiple 
development languages, such as C++, were cited by the ESA as being some of the 
reasons LynxOS-178 was chosen to manage navigation functionality in the Galileo 
satellite mission (Howard, 2007).  
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 G. RTEMS 
The Real-Time Executive for Multiprocessor Systems (RTEMS) is an open-
source hard real-time operating systems designed for embedded systems and available 
under the GNU General Public License (“RTEMS Community,” n.d.). RTEMS is 
compatible with a wide variety of processors including the ERC32, Leon, ARM, 
Pentium, various members of x86 architecture, MIPS and PowerPC (Silva, 2009), 
RTEMS supports a number of open standard APIs including POSIX and BSD sockets. 
Applications can be written in C/C++ using the POSIX API; additional languages 
supported are Ada, Java, Go and Lua (Bloom, 2013). 
RTEMS has been and continues to be used in many different space projects. 
RTEMS was used on the FedSat, a research microsatellite developed by an Australian 
cooperative research group composed of university, commercial and government 
organizations (“Operating Systems,” 2008; “Fed Sat 1,” n.d.) between 2003 and 2006. 
RTEMS was also used on the Galileo GIOVE-A, ESA’s first prototype for a navigation 
satellite (“Galileo Pathfinder,” 2010). RTEMS is a supported operating system on 
NASA’s SpaceCube satellites (Seagrave, 2008) and is being used on NASA’s Mars 
Reconnaissance Orbiter (Komolafe & Sventek, 2006/07; “Mars Reconnissance Orbiter,” 
n.d.). 
RTEMS version 4.8.1 has been ported to run on the XtratuM hypervisor as a para- 
virtualized guest OS. The ported code includes board support packages for the LEON2 
and LEON3 processors (“RTEMS,” n.d.). RTEMS can also run on the PikeOS 
microkernel developed by Sysco (“SYSGO’s Safe and Secure,” 2010) and on the AIR 
microkernel. RTEMS is the basis for the hardware abstraction layers of AIR but can also 
run as a client partition alongside the ARINC-653 API (Schoofs, 2011).  
1. Space Standards Compliance 
The European Space Agency used version 4.8.0 of RTEMS to develop a “space-
qualified” version of RTEMS that was qualified under the Galileo software standard 
(GSWS) to work on the ERC32, LEON2 and LEON3 processors. The GSWS is a space 
system software compliance policy that sets standards for the development, integration 
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 and testing of software used specifically in NASA’ Galileo Spacecraft. GSWS requires 
independent module/unit testing to ensure software safety and assurance (Feldt, Torkar, 
Ahmad, & Raza, 2010). The ESA considered validating RTEMS with DO-178B but 
decided GSWS was a more complete standard at the time hence its use. The space-
qualified version of RTEMS is comprised of a series of scripts and patches that when 
applied to RTEMS code will delete some managers and will add others, making the 
system qualified up to a GSWS Development Assurance level B, which means that the 
OS does not contain any unused code (Silva, 2009).  
RTEMS has continued to evolve and as of version 4.10 ESA’s version is not 
maintained in the main RTEMS repository (Lee, 2012), which makes consistent 
development a challenge. ESA’s goal was to make RTEMS a building block in space 
missions but it first needed to get RTEMS TRL6 certified (“Definition of Technology,” 
n.d.). To achieve this goal, the ESA decided to focus on the components of RTEMS that 
were relevant to ESA space missions and enlisted the firm Edisoft to establish an RTEMS 
maintenance center that dealt only with the RTEMS developments being made by ESA 
instead of the general RTEMS community (“Operating Systems,” 2008). This diversion 
has led to some confusion and frustration amongst developers who are unclear on which 
version of RTEMS to work with for space projects (Lee, 2012).  
2. Design 
RTEMS (see Figure 16) supports dynamic memory allocation, inter-task 
communication and synchronization, various scheduling configurations, priority 
inheritance, responsive interrupt management and symmetric multi-processing across 
multiple cores. Such services are implemented by a set of “resource managers.” Core 
functions that are used by multiple managers, such as scheduling and object management 
are maintained as part of the “SuperCore” (Bloom, 2013).  
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Figure 16.  RTEMS Conceptual Architecture (from “RTEMS Architecture,” n.d.)  
a. Task Management 
Tasks are defined in RTEMS as the “smallest thread of execution that can 
compete on its own for resources” (On-Line Applications Research Corporation, 2013, p. 
64). When a task is created, it is allocated a task control block data structure. The TCB is 
the only RTEMS internal data structure that an application can access and modify. Tasks 
have a priority assigned to them when they are initially created (On-Line Applications 
Research Corporation, 2013).  
b. Scheduling Management  
The RTEMS scheduler is in charge of managing a given set of tasks in the ready 
state and determining when tasks get executed. The default scheduling algorithm is a 
priority-based scheduler, however, developers can also work with the following: a simple 
priority scheduler that maintains a single linear list--meant for small applications, earliest 
deadline first scheduler, constant bandwidth server scheduler (each task is given a CPU 
budget and if the budget is exceeded then a callback is invoked), simple SMP (symmetric 
multiprocessing) or a partitioned/clustered scheduler, which allows developers to choose 
different policies for different cores (On-Line Applications Research Corporation, 2013).  
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 c. Memory Management 
RTEMS uses a flat memory model and does not support virtual memory 
allocation, segmentation or MMU hardware support. The partition manager creates and 
deletes partitions and dynamically allocates memory to them in fixed-sized units (On-
Line Applications Research Corporation, 2013). The POSIX mprotect() function can be 
used to protect regions of memory (“RTEMS 4.10.99.0 On-line Library,” 2014).  
3. Analysis 
RTEMS is proven in the space community given its use in many different space 
applications and its use by the ESA to develop a “space qualified” version of the RTOS. 
Its compatibility with many different processors, as well as its extensive documentation 
makes it an attractive RTOS for space system developers. 
As stated previously, there is some confusion within the space systems 
development community over which versions of RTEMS to work with since the space 
qualified version of RTEMS is based on an older version of the RTOS and is not part of 
the mainline RTEMS code development tree. RTEMS also does not support memory 
protection other than what POSIX offers and leaves it up to the developer to incorporate 
such features.  
H. ADDITIONAL REAL-TIME OPERATING SYSTEMS 
The following real-time operating systems are worth surveying due to their 
compatibility with key virtualization architectures despite the fact that there is limited 
documentation on how they function. We discuss the important attributes of each RTOS.  
1. LithOS 
LithOS is developed and maintained by the Spanish company Fentiss. LithOS is 
an ARINC-653 compliant para-virtualized RTOS designed to run as a partition on the 
XtratuM hypervisor (see Figure 17). Though there is no documentation of LithOS’s 
deployment in space, it was designed specifically to support systems requiring strict 
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 spatial and temporal isolation that run on the XtratuM hypervisor, which the ESA is using 
to evaluate virtualization and IMA-SP.  
 
Figure 17.  LithOS Architecture, Running As an XtratuM Partition (from 
“LithOS,” n.d.) 
The XtratuM hypervisor (see Chapter IV) incorporates many of the ARINC-653 
spatial and temporal isolation mechanisms. LithOS leverages these when running as a 
virtual machine on the hypervisor. Additionally, LithOS provides support for multi-
processing, intra-process communication and process scheduling, which are services that 
XtratuM does not provide.  
LithOS follows the ARINC-653 standard and implements the ARINC-653 API, as 
well as its own native API. LithOS also includes a few non-portable services relating to 
time and partition management that the ARINC-653 API does not include, which are 
non-portable.  
2. VxWorks 653 
VxWorks 653 is a version of VxWorks that NASA has recognized as being a 
potential operating system for future projects (Raines, 2012; Barry, 2009; Jaekel, 2014). 
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 VxWorks 653 is an ARINC-653 certified operating system that is comprised of the 
module OS and the partition OS. The module OS is the supervisor-mode OS that enforces 
time-space partitioning through memory management services and static schedules to 
ensures fault isolation. The partition OS is designed to run within a VxWorks 653 user-
mode partition, which is a virtualized run-time environment that supports applications. 
The partition OS is also known as “vThreads,” a multi-threading system based on 
VxWorks 5.5, which includes additional libraries that support the ARINC-653 APEX and 
POSIX APIs. Each instance of vThreads also contains its own scheduler. Figure 18 
illustrates the architecture of VxWorks 653.  
 
Figure 18.  VxWorks 653 Architecture (from Parkinson & Kinnan, n.d.) 
Next, we discuss the virtualization architectures that are designed for, or are 
applicable to the space domain.  
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 IV. VIRTUALIZATION ARCHITECTURES USED IN SPACE 
In this chapter, we survey a selection of virtualization architectures that are 
applicable to the space domain (see Table 5). These architectures have been selected 
based on their use in space or their consideration by the space community for future use. 
We discuss how each architecture is being used by the space community, its basic design 
and what processors and operating systems it supports. We focus on how each 
architecture supports the real-time requirements of its applications and provide 
comparative analysis. We also review some virtualization architectures that have space-
relevant attributes—such as real-time process support, high assurance properties or 
space-qualified RTOS compatibility—that make them worth surveying for possible space 
application.  
Our analysis of each virtualization architecture is based on a variety of 
characteristics including its maturity within the space community, licensing, 
documentation availability, standards compliance and hardware and software capability. 
We also consider the functionality of the virtualization layer with regards to its memory 




Table 5.   Summary of Virtualization Architecture Key Attributes 
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Xen-based No Some ARM, x86 All guests 
supported by 
Xen 
DO-178C ~70K Yes Yes 









Unknown NASA NASA 
AIR Open-source Microkernel Unknown No All All 
guests(designed 
to support most 
OSes) 




NOVA Open-source Separation kernel No Yes X86 All guests (via 
emulation) 
None 9k lines of 
code 
No No 




None Unknown No No 
Proteus Unknown  No No PowerPC All guests (via 
full 
virtualization) 
None 15 Kb No No 
RT-Xen Open-source Xen-based No No All Xen Linux guests 
(unspecified 
versions) 






 A. XTRATUM 
XtratuM is an open-source7 type-1 hypervisor that uses paravirtualization (Crespo 
et al., 2014) and is designed to provide temporal and spatial isolation for safety critical 
applications (“XtratuM Hypervisor,” 2012). XtratuM is based on the concept of robust 
partitioning and allows processes of different security levels to run concurrently. XtratuM 
is designed to reflect ARINC-653 standards, but is not fully ARINC-653 compliant 
because of the responsibilities delegated to partitions. The XtratuM hypervisor works 
with the x86, ARM and PowerPC processors (“XtratuM Product,” n.d.; Zhou, 2009), as 
well as the LEON2, 3, and 4 implementations of the SPARC processor. XtratuM can host 
LithOS, RTEMS, PaRTiKle, and Linux operating systems.  
To the best of our knowledge, XtratuM has yet to be deployed in space however 
considerable research is in progress focusing on its ability to support space systems. 
Since 2012, the ESA has been conducting a set of studies to evaluate the effectiveness of 
using time-space partitioned (TSP) architectures in space, using XtratuM as the base for 
this research. These studies are conducted under the ESA’s EagleEye virtual space 
mission intended for software testing (“New-generation Aircraft,” n.d.). As of 2013, the 
EagleEye TSP project has tested XtratuM version 3.4 with support for the LEON3 
processor with a memory management unit (Bos et al., 2013). In 2014, Carrascosa et al. 
(2014) documented porting XtratuM to the LEON4 multicore processor in support of the 
ESA’s ongoing efforts to test and evaluate XtratuM’s performance with multicore 
processors. 
NASA (n.d.) also carried out some research with the XtratuM hypervisor during 
the 2012 Internal Research and Development Program (IRAD) that sought to demonstrate 
the benefits of virtualization on the LEON 3 flight processor.  
 
7 Commercial license also available. 
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 1. Design 
XtratuM, illustrated in Figure 19, is designed as a “monolithic, non-premptive 
kernel” (“XtratuM Product,” n.d.). The entire hypervisor layer operates in supervisory 
mode and no process may preempt it (see Figure 18). The hypervisor layer is responsible 
for virtualizing the machine’s CPU, memory, interrupts and other peripheral devices. 
 
Figure 19.  XtratuM Architecture (from “XtratuM Hypervisor,” 2011). 
2. Partition Management 
Partitions are the independent execution environments managed by the XtratuM 
hypervisor. Partitions can be an application, an RTOS or a general purpose operating 
system. XtratuM partitions do not share any of their address space. Partitions are started 
automatically after the XtratuM hypervisor completes the initial boot sequence. There are 
two types of partitions supported by XtratuM: system partition and user partition. System 
partitions are also referred to as supervisor partitions in some literature, but the 
developers changed this terminology to system partition to avoid confusion with 
hardware modes (“XtratuM Hypervisor,” 2011). System partitions are able to suspend, 
resume, halt or reset the execution state of user partitions (Masmano, Ripoll, Peiró, & 
Crespo, 2010) through specific hypercalls. This activity is regulated by resource and 
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 inter-process communication policies defined at configuration time for each partition. 
System partitions are able to manage the system but still rely on the hypervisor to access 
hardware. For multi-thread applications, the operating system or run-time support 
libraries on which the applications run must support threads (“Xtratum Hypervisor,” 
2011). This is different from the ARINC-653 specification for partitions, which isolates 
and manages threads and processes inside a partition through the use of a defined API. 
3. Memory Management 
XtratuM is designed to enforce spatial isolation with or without an MMU, though 
full spatial isolation is only guaranteed on versions of the hypervisor ported to processors 
with an MMU. For processors without an MMU (namely the Leon2), XtratuM uses the 
processor’s write protection registers to enforce isolation through memory write 
protection policies, which deny partitions the ability to write into another partition’s 
memory space. For MMU supported versions of XtratuM, a kernel memory manager 
module uses the MMU to enforce spatial isolation between partitions. If specified at 
configuration time, the memory manager can support authorized memory sharing 
between partitions for inter-partition communication (Masmano et al., 2010). 
4. Scheduling Management 
XtratuM implements an ARINC-653 cyclic scheduling policy in which time slots 
for partitions to interact with the processor are statically defined. XtratuM takes into 
account the overhead incurred with context switches that occur when one partition’s time 
slot is over and another partitions’ time slot begins. Since XtratuM offers deterministic 
processing, it knows the worst-case execution time (WCET) and the best-case execution 
time (BCET) of context switches and hypercalls. In order to make context switches as 
efficient as possible, XtratuM’s scheduling use the empirically determined BCET and 
WCET of context switches and any in-progress hypercalls to calculate worst-case delay. 
With this cost in mind, XtratuM can adjust execution time by factoring it into the allotted 
time slot (“XtratuM Hypervisor,” 2011). 
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 5. Analysis 
The fact that XtratuM is part of an ESA initiative to research virtualization in 
space and many of its refinements have been motivated by space research distinguishes 
XtratuM from some of the virtualization architectures we survey here. Its open-source 
license and well-documented API make it an attractive architecture for projects with 
limited budgets. The one main drawback is the limited support it provides for both 
hardware and software.  
B. ARLX 
ARINC-653 Real-time Linux on Xen (ARLX) is a hypervisor developed and 
maintained by the Michigan-based company Dorner Works Ltd. (DornerWorks, n.d.). 
ARLX is a type-1 hypervisor based on the open-source Xen hypervisor, but with 
extensions DornerWorks claims make it a high safety and security assurance system. 
ARLX was designed based on the DO-178C8 certification standard and there is an 
initiative to get ARLX formally verified to Common Criteria Evaluation Assurance Level 
6+ (Studer, 2014). Some formal method analysis on ARLX has been performed, 
discussed later in this section.  
ARLX is available via subscription under a permissive license, meaning that with 
an initial purchase all source code is available and can be modified. ARLX is compatible 
with ARM and x86 family processors and supports any operating systems compatible 
with Xen (VanderLeest, Greve, & Skentzos, 2013). A Navy-fielded deployment of 
ARLX runs VxWorks and Integrity in guest domains (Santangelo, 2013).  
ARLX is currently being used on unspecified platforms by the Joint Tactical 
Networking Center, which is managed by the Navy’s Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
Command (SPAWAR). ARLX is also being used by the company sci_Zone, a NASA 
small business innovation research awardee, on its QuickSAT project. QuickSAT is a 
space-hypervisor that supports virtualized payloads and systems on CubeSATs and 
8 DO-178C replaced DO-178B in 2012.  
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 MicroSATs. QuickSAT is being used in NASA research centers and by the Air Force 
Research Laboratory’s University NanoSat program (Santangelo, 2013).  
1. Design 
ARLX core architecture follows that of Xen, but it modifies the kernel and adds 
another privileged domain in addition to Dom0 to support input and output. The code 
base of ARLX is 30–50% smaller than the generic code base of Xen, which 
DornerWorks claims is over 150,000 lines of code. The designers of ARLX point out that 
ARLX is still a work-in-progress and that the hypervisor is in heavy development. As a 
result, some features, like minimized partition memory footprints, optimized partition 
switching mechanisms and full ARINC-653 compliance are still future projects (Greve & 
VanderLeest, 2013). The current status of these projects is unknown.  
In ARLX, the Xen kernel is modified so that it implements time and space 
partitioning according to the ARINC-653 standard. The typical Xen scheduler is replaced 
with the ARINC-653 scheduler. Additionally, an ARINC-653 memory manager replaces 
the traditional Xen memory manager in the Xen kernel. To the best of our knowledge, 
ARLX requires an MMU to enforce spatial isolation. The inter-partition ARINC-653 API 
is added to Xen’s communication architecture, which allows for ARINC-653 compliant 
inter-partition communication mechanisms (Greve & VanderLeest, 2013). The 
developers of ARLX define five security policy domains that are used to enforce 
information flow between partitions. Security domains refer to information flow levels 
and not to the guest domains running on top of Xen. These security domains are listed in 







 Table 6.   ARLX Security Domains (from Greve & VanderLeest, 2013) 
SECURITY DOMAIN CONTENT 
ARLX_INIT Initialization read-only data for system startup 
ARLX_CONFIG 
Configuration data only written at 
system initialization. Read-only 
while system is running 
ARLX_XEN State of Xen hypervisor 
ARLX_DOM0 State of Xen Dom0 (privileged Domain) 
ARLX_DOMU State of Xen DomU’s (non-privileged) 
 
Information flows from top down with two exceptions: Dom0 and Xen are able to 
communicate freely and each DomU can communicate if specified by configuration. 
There is no domain defined for the privileged I/O domain.  
2. Partition Management 
The ARLX Dom0 is designed to be as small and intended to be formally 
verifiable. Dom0 is still implemented by a Linux-based OS but the developers are 
considering using FreeRTOS instead—which has a smaller code base and has a certified 
version (SafeRTOS)—or some other certified OS, like INTEGRITY or VxWorks 
(Studer, 2014). 
ARLX features a privileged domain, separate from Dom0, which is responsible 
for I/O management between partitions. In standard Xen, Dom0 provides this 
functionality. ARLX reduces the trusted computing base of the Dom0 by isolating the I/O 
responsibilities into a separate domain. This design decision is based on the idea of Dom0 
disaggregation, which takes control logic out of Dom0 and distributes it throughout 
different domains, with the idea of making each domain small and easily verifiable 
(Murray, 2008). The privileged I/O domain also regulates bandwidth usage between 
partitions that share I/O devices. This feature is not required by the ARINC-653 standard, 
but the ARLX developers felt it was valuable since it can incorporate determinism into 
bandwidth usage for each partition. ARLX handles shared I/O by splitting shared I/O 
device drivers up, with half of the driver residing in the I/O domain and half residing in 
another DomU. The DomU’s portion of the driver contains the API to communicate with 
 58 
 the I/O domain. The I/O domain’s portion of the driver provides access to memory and 
registers through memory mapping. The architecture of ARLX is illustrated in Figure 20.  
 
Figure 20.  ARLX Hypervisor Environment (from Santangelo, 2013) 
3. Analysis  
ARLX is a unique architecture due to its integration of ARINC-653 compliance 
into a well-known open-source hypervisor. To our knowledge, ARLX is also one of the 
few virtualization architectures surveyed that has actually been deployed in space, i.e., 
via the QuickSat/Xen program. ARLX’s licensing is also an attractive feature since it 
allows developers to access and modify source code. ARLX, however, is still a work in 
progress as its developers attest, and lacks all the features of other architectures, 
including being fully ARINC-653 certified.  
DornerWorks is pursuing formal verification of the ARLX hypervisor, since its 
target is use in safety critical embedded systems. As part of this effort, it conducted an 
initial analysis of the security properties for the system (VanderLeest et al., 2013). This 
study found that there was substantial work required for the system to be considered high 
assurance. Though there are many benefits to leveraging Xen for ARLX, there are also 
drawbacks. There have been several high profile vulnerabilities exposed against the Xen 
hypervisor over the years (Kovacs, 2014; Apecechea, 2014) related to the fact that it was 
not built from the onset to be high assurance. Its code base is also much larger than other 
surveyed virtualization architectures, which have smaller code footprints to limit the 
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 trusted computing base. In particular, ARLX’s addition of a second privileged domain 
under Xen increases its TCB.  
C. PIKEOS 
PikeOS is a proprietary virtualization architecture developed and maintained by 
the company Sysgo. PikeOS is a separation kernel-based type-1 hypervisor that supports 
paravirtualization and hardware-assisted virtualization.9 PikeOS is DO-178B, MILS and 
ARINC-653 compliant and is in the process of becoming formally verified, a requirement 
for Common Criteria EAL 6 certification (“Publishable Summary,” 2012). PikeOS is 
portable to the PowerPC, x86, ARM, MIPS and SPARC V8/LEON processor families. 
PikeOS can run Linux and RTEMS as guest operating systems. It supports multiple APIs 
including POSIX, Ada and RTEMS. PikeOS is also compatible with a certifiable IP stack 
and offers communication encryption and binary verification (“Products PikeOS 
Hypervisor,” n.d.). 
PikeOS (see Figure 21) was used as the hypervisor in NASA’s 2013 Internal 
Research and Development Program. This program explored flight hardware 
virtualization for science data processing, to consolidate multiple physical processors to 
reduce their size, weight and power consumption and to increase security on flight 
systems (“Fall 2013,” 2013). Their test configuration consisted of PikeOS run on a 
LEON3 processor, supporting ElinOS (Sysgo’s verison of embedded Linux) in one 
partition and custom Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) software running in another 
partition. The ElinOS VM was used to do non-critical science data processing that did not 
have real-time requirements, and the GSFC partition was used as the core flight executive 
that handled critical functions with hard real-time requirements. The project 
demonstrated that when the ElinOS partition crashed, it had no effect on the GSFC 
partition. The 2013 tests with PikeOS also demonstrated that multiple flight processors 
can be booted in virtual machines and that virtual machines can be rebooted individually 
mid-flight (NASA, n.d.; Cudmore, 2013).  
9 Paravirtualized virtual machines can also leverage hardware assisted virtualization if the processor 
supports it.  
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Figure 21.  PikeOS Architecture (from Lehrbaum, 2013) 
1. Design 
There are two layers to the PikeOS architecture: the microkernel layer and the 
virtualization layer (see Figure 3). The microkernel is responsible for managing address 
space separation, partition scheduling, inter-partition communication and enforcing 
communication control and access measures for threads and tasks (Tverdyshev, 2011; 
Müller, Paulitsch, Tverdyshev, & Blasum, 2012). The virtualization layer is responsible 
for implementing the API for partitions and guest applications.  
PikeOS has two primary abstractions: tasks and threads. Threads are always 
associated with a task and execute based on the task’s state. Tasks consist of a virtual 
address space, threads and other resources that they might be allocated. The microkernel 
controls all resources in the system, is responsible for managing communication for tasks 
and threads and delegating use of resources to partitions based on the security policy set 
at configuration time (Tverdyshev, 2011; Baumann, Bormer, Blasum, & Tverdyshev, 
2011).  
2. Partition Management 
Each partition consists of a set of tasks, threads and communication ports (as 
defined in the ARINC-653 API). It is the job of the virtualization layer to instantiate these 
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 partitions, mediate communication with other partitions based on a pre-defined security 
policy and control access to system resources.  
3. Memory Management 
The microkernel has a memory manager that assigns address space through 
memory pages to the partitions. Partition memory pages are statically defined at 
configuration time and assigned to partitions by the memory manager at run-time. At run- 
time, each partition can dynamically store data and allocates memory to its applications 
through these memory pages (Baumann et al., 2011).   
4. Scheduling Management 
PikeOS supports a combination of scheduling methods including priority-based, 
time-driven and proportional sharing scheduling. Using a combination of scheduling 
methods ensures that hard real-time threads get scheduled first and prevents low-priority 
threads from being starved out of processing time (Kaiser, 2007).  
Partitions running on PikeOS are statically assigned a priority level, by which the 
microkernel schedules partitions based on this priority. In addition, PikeOS uses what are 
referred to as “time domains” in which priority-based scheduling of threads is based on 
their “class,” i.e., time-driven, event-driven or non-real-time. Event-driven and time-
driven threads are assigned a higher priority than other threads. Threads are grouped into 
time domains and can only execute when their time domain is active, no matter their 
priority.  
There are two types of time domains: foreground and background domains. The 
foreground domain is always running, and the background domain is scheduled by the 
microkernel based on a static schedule determined at configuration. The background 
domain can run at the same time as one other domain. Event-driven threads are assigned 
to the background domain. The highest priority task between the two active domains gets 
scheduled first. Low priority threads get executed when all event and time-driven threads 
within their time domains are completed (Kaiser, 2007; Kaiser, 2009). 
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 5. Analysis 
PikeOS exhibits many of the properties required to support multiple software 
environments in space. It has a small trusted computing base with limited complexity, it 
is certified and compliant with many of the primary standards recognized by the space 
community and has demonstrated its robustness by protecting highly critical domains 
when another domain fails. PikeOS is also compatible with a number of relevant space 
processors, including the MIPS processor, which is not supported by XtratuM. PikeOS is 
proprietary and it is unclear how accessible its source code is to developers, which, if 
limited, might be a drawback. Sysgo also does not appear to have a substantial presence 
in the space community with its other products, including a modified version of Linux for 
embedded systems, which might limit PikeOS’s use if other virtualization architectures 
from recognized vendors are deemed more compatible with legacy systems.  
D. AIR 
ARINC-653 Interface in RTEMS (AIR) (Rufino & Filipe, 2007), is a 
virtualization architecture that supports the execution of safety critical real-time 
applications and non-real-time applications concurrently. AIR, like XtratuM, was a 
project initiated by the ESA as part of their assessment of adapting time and space 
partitioning software for space systems. The original AIR was a proof-of-concept project 
to build an ARINC-653 system specifically for the space domain. A final report for the 
AIR project published in 2007 provided the foundational architecture for an ARINC-653 
compliant system for space. Since then, AIR-II seeks to evolve AIR from proof-of-
concept to a deployable product (Rufino, Craveiro, Schoofs, Tatibana, & Windsor, 2009). 
As of 2014, AIR is referenced as an open-source product offered by the international 
aeronautics company, GMV (“air Robust,” n.d.). According to GMV, AIR is currently 
TRL level 5, which means the system has been tested and prototyped in a relevant 
environment. The status of AIR testing and on which space systems AIR may be 
considered for deployment in the future are both unknown. AIR is designed to be 
hardware and software independent. 
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 1. Design 
AIR is comprised of three primary components: the AIR partition management 
kernel (PMK), the real-time operating system kernel for each partition (POS), and the 
ARINC-653 APEX API. The PMK is a microkernel responsible for partition scheduling 
and inter-partition communication. Each POS kernel is abstracted through the POS 
adaptation layer which allows the architecture to be kernel independent. 
2. Scheduling Management 
AIR has an ARINC-653 scheduling manager within the PMK that ensures 
priority-based partition scheduling, as well as POS schedulers that are responsible for 
scheduling processes within each partition. AIR also includes “timeliness enhancement 
mechanisms” within the PMK layer, which are meant to further ensure robust scheduling 
within the system (Rufino et al., 2009). One enhancement mechanism is mode-based 
scheduling, which give the option of switching to different scheduling modes for a 
partition. Another is process deadline monitoring, whereby the PMK verifies that earliest 
deadline tasks in a partition are completed by when they are intended. If they are not, 
then the PMK reports this to the ARINC-653 compliant health monitor.  
3. Memory Management 
AIR accounts for memory protection and management with the use of the 
processor’s MMU or MPU. Each partition has its own page directory. Memory pages and 
shared libraries can be shared between partitions. POS and APEX code can also be 
shared across partitions (“Air Overview,” 2011). Memory and code sharing between 
partitions is done based on pre-defined inter-partition communication policies established 
at configuration time (Rosa, 2011).  
4. Analysis 
Notable, attractive attributes of the AIR virtualization architecture, illustrated in 
Figure 22, include the fact that it is processor and operating system/application agnostic, 
and that it is open-source. The fact that it incorporates the ARINC-653 functionalities and 
API make it a robust virtualization architecture to consider in the space domain. The 
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 main drawback of the AIR project is its status as a prototype, though it does appear from 
GMV documentation that the hypervisor is being actively maintained and developed. 
There is no current documentation on the AIR hypervisor being fielded in any space 
system.  
 
Figure 22.  AIR Architecture (from Rosa, 2011; Rufino et al., 2009). 
E. ADDITIONAL VIRTUALIZATION ARCHITECTURES  
The following section briefly surveys several virtualization architectures worthy 
of mention, despite lack of consideration by the space community and/or lack of 
sufficient documentation to survey adequately.  
1. Green Hills Multivisor 
Green Hills Software’s INTEGRITY multivisor is a separation kernel based 
virtualization architecture based on the INTEGRITY RTOS kernel, but with the added 
ability to support paravirtualized operating systems and leverage hardware virtualization 
assistance to fully virtualize operating systems. The multivisor can support multiple 
operating systems—including Windows, Linux, VxWorks and Android—and multiple 
processors, both single and multicore, including IntelVT, ARM, FreeScale and any 
processor supported by the INTEGRITY RTOS. To our knowledge, the INTEGRITY 
Multivisor has not been deployed in space systems. It is marketed primarily to the 
telecommunications and avionics industries; however, the use of the INTEGRITY kernel 
Health Monitor 
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 is space systems makes the INTEGRITY multivisor a potentially deployable architecture 
in the future (“Integrity Multivisor Datasheets,” n.d.).  
2. Wind River Hypervisor 
The Wind River hypervisor is an embedded type-1 hypervisor (“Wind River 
Hypervisor,” n.d.) designed to host operating systems and applications of mixed 
criticality and with different timing requirements, from hard real-time to general-purpose 
on single or multicore processors. The Wind River hypervisor supports full and 
paravirtualization of operating systems and can leverage hardware-assisted virtualization 
features on processors. It is designed to host any operating system or application through 
the use of the VxWorks API and is designed to run on top of a variety of different 
processor families, including ARM, PowerPC, and Intel.  
The hypervisor, like the VxWorks operating system, is highly configurable and 
offers different scheduling options on single or multicore processors, different means of 
configuring external devices and different ways to virtualize each partition (full or partial 
virtualization). The hypervisor is responsible for scheduling partitions (called virtual 
boards) and uses time-slice or priority-driven methods. Threads are completely event-
driven, meaning they are only executed when an event prompts them. Developers have 
the customization option of replacing the hypervisor scheduler. External device driver 
management is also configurable: drivers can be located within partitions or within the 
hypervisor and can be shared or private resources (“Wind River Hypervisor,” n.d.).  
The hypervisor is not known to be compliant with any relevant standards, though 
Wind River offers a separation kernel for systems requiring high assurance (not part of 
this survey). The relationship between these two products is unclear. To our knowledge, 
the Wind River hypervisor has not been deployed or considered for deployment in any 
space system. The hypervisor is marketed primarily to the industrial control and 
telecommunications industries.  
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 3. SafeHype 
SafeHype is a prototype small, lightweight satellite hypervisor being designed by 
Intelligence Automation, Inc. based out of Rockville, Maryland. In 2013, the firm was 
awarded a $150,000 grant by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in order 
to develop the hypervisor (“SBIR SafeHype,” n.d.). Unfortunately, there is not an 
extensive amount of information available through the open literature. SafeHype is a 
small hypervisor meant to virtualize satellite payloads and support dynamic provisioning 
of virtual machines mid-flight (“SBIR SafeHype,” n.d.). The hypervisor is designed to 
make use of hardware support and paravirtualization. It is claimed the code base of the 
hypervisor is small enough to be formally verified (“Intelligent Automation,” n.d.). 
SafeHype is a project that may yield a viable virtualization system for future spacecraft. 
The mechanism for dynamically provisioning virtual machines mid-flight is interesting 
though, unfortunately, there is no information on how this is accomplished.  
4. NOVA 
NOVA is a research “microvisor” developed by Udo Steinberg and Bernhard 
Kauer from the Technical University of Dresden in Germany. Though not designed for 
space systems, it is an interesting architecture that has some attributes that are important 
to the space community, including a small size and spatial and temporal isolation 
(“NOVA Virtualization,” n.d.).  
NOVA is a small hypervisor, or “microvisor,” that runs on x86 processors that 
support the Advanced Configuration and Power Interface, an open industry standard. It 
can also run under QEMU as a virtual machine. NOVA has its own kernel and 
application program interface and makes use of hardware virtualization support available 
on the x86 processor.  
The NOVA environment consists of three layers: a microhypervisor running in 
kernel mode, the user-level environment and the VM layers or domains. Security and 
performance-critical functionalities are handled inside the microvisor. All other 
functionalities run in user mode outside of the microvisor. The microvisor is responsible 
for interrupt handling, scheduling and memory management. NOVA uses an object-
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 oriented interface to delegate and regulate access to resources. There are five basic kernel 
objects (see Table 7). When one of these objects is created by a domain, it gets associated 
with a “capability” that belongs to the domain creating the object. Depending on that 
domain’s policy, access to these objects can be shared with other domains.  
Table 7.   The Five Kernel Objects in the NOVA Microvisor (from Steinberg & 
Kauer, 2010) 
Kernel Object Function 
Protection Domain Spatial Isolation 
Execution Context Protection Domain Thread and CPU execution 
Scheduling Context Temporal Isolation 
Portals Intra-partition (domain) communication 
Semaphores Execution synchronization 
 
What makes NOVA an interesting virtualization solution for space is the fact that 
it has a small code base, has a means of controlling access to critical resources through its 
capability-based interface and is open-source. The object-oriented approach to access 
control employed by the NOVA microvisor is similar to the proprietary INTEGRITY 
kernel, which regulates information flow through statically defined policies for subjects 
and objects (discussed in Chapter III). The main draw backs of the microvisor are the fact 
that it is only compatible with the x86 processor, relies on processor virtualization 
support and does not make any claim to support real-time systems.  
5. Proteus 
Proteus was designed as a research project of the Heinz Nixdorf Institute in 
Germany as an open-source type-1 hypervisor able to run general-purpose operating 
systems and real-time operating systems concurrently. Proteus supports both full and 
paravirtualization on PowerPC multicore processors (Gilles, Groesbrink, Baldin, & 
Kerstan, 2013) and does not rely on hardware support for virtualization. Figure 23 
illustrates the architectures of the Proteus Hypervisor.  
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Figure 23.  The Proteus Hypervisor Architecture (from Baldin & Kerstan, 2009) 
There are two execution modes on the PowerPC processor that the hypervisor 
uses: applications run in problem mode; interrupts, the virtual machine scheduler and the 
inter-partition communication manager run in supervisor mode. Device drivers and other 
non-critical resources are run in a separate partition on top of the hypervisor and run in 
problem mode. Problem mode is subdivided into two logical modes: VM privileged 
mode and VM problem mode. System calls made by the virtual machine are executed in 
the VM privileged mode.  
Proteus uses the PowerPC MMU for memory management and each VM running 
on the hypervisor has its own dedicated address space that is statically defined. For 
temporal isolation, Proteus supports different configurations of core support for virtual 
machines. VMs can be dedicated to one core or can be divided among multiple cores. 
The hypervisor uses a fixed time slice approach to scheduling, based on statically 
assigned priorities.  
Proteus is an interesting virtualization architecture to consider for space due to its 
claimed support for real-time systems, the fact that it does not rely on hardware 
virtualization support and its compatibility with the PowerPC processor family, which is 
a common space system processor (Ginosar, 2012). It is unclear however, what type of 
real-time systems Proteus can actually support and whether or not the hypervisor is 
suitable for hard real-time applications.  
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 6. X-Hyp 
X-Hyp is a type-1 embedded hypervisor that supports paravirtualization and is 
designed specifically for real-time systems. The hypervisor comes with a paravirtualized 
version of FreeRTOS and supports Linux, RTEMS and µcos and is compatible with the 
ARM-9 and Cortex processors. X-Hyp is available under both commercial licensing and 
open-source. The hypervisor has its own API with 54 hypercalls for the ARM processor. 
Figure 24 shows the basic architecture of X-Hyp. X-Hyp has little documentation but 
supports some valuable characteristics that make it worth mentioning, including its 
support for three RTOSs used in space and its availability as an open-source product.  
 
Figure 24.  The Basic X-Hyp Architecture (from “X-hyp Paravirtualized,” n.d.) 
7. RT-Xen 
RT-Xen is a Washington University project focused on incorporating soft real-
time guarantees into the open source Xen hypervisor. The Office of Naval Research 
awarded a three-year grant to make RT-Xen a real-time virtualization architecture for 
embedded systems (“RT-Xen Project,” 2013). RT-Xen incorporates resource 
reservations into domain scheduling and adds real-time schedulers at the kernel and the 
domain level. The kernel scheduler is responsible for managing the scheduling of each 
domain based on configuration data provided by Dom0. The configuration data includes 
priority levels of the domains, their allotted time slice, the processor cores they are 
allowed to run on and the amount of processor power they get allocated. This scheduler 
uses either an earliest deadline first or rate monotonic policy to manage domain 
scheduling. Within each domain, there is another real-time scheduler responsible for 
scheduling its own processes (Xi, Wilson, Lu, & Gill, 2011; “Xen Project: RT-Xen,” 
n.d.). 
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 Though not designed for space systems, RT-Xen is an interesting technology that 
might be considered in conjunction with ARLX. Whereas ARLX is designed for high 
assurance, RT-Xen is designed for real-time guarantees, both of which are attributes 
required for mission-critical space systems. RT-Xen, however, is only meant to meet soft 
real-time requirements and suffers from the same drawbacks as ARLX, namely that it is 
based on a large, legacy code base not intended for high assurance applications.  
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 V. REMOTE FINGERPRINTING OF VIRTUALIZED 
OPERATING SYSTEMS 
In this chapter, we discuss our work in measuring and comparing fingerprints for 
virtualized operating systems, employing methods explored previously by Chen et al. 
(2008). We use TCP timestamp measurements to derive a timestamp skew, which prior 
work shows can be used to characterize some operating systems remotely. Our work 
focuses both on (1) validating prior experiments with fingerprinting general-purpose 
operating systems under different virtualization scenarios, and (2) extending these results 
to real-time systems, using Real-Time Linux (i.e., Linux with the PREEMPT_RT patch 
enabled) as a target.  
A. MOTIVATION 
The ability to remotely fingerprint a guest operating system running as a virtual 
machine is valuable for the reconnaissance phase of system exploitation. Since remote 
fingerprinting does not require direct access to the machine, the fingerprint of virtualized 
operating systems can help detect virtual honeynets and enable adversaries to exploit 
hypervisor-specific vulnerabilities, if the fingerprint of the guest OS leaks information 
about their underlying hypervisor. To the best of our knowledge, there is no prior work 
measuring TCP timestamp skew on real-time operating systems, either running directly 
on hardware or as a guest on a hypervisor.  
B. TEST METHODOLOGY  
In our experiment, we compare the TCP timestamp skew variation between 
operating systems running on bare metal and on a virtualized platform. We do this by 
replicating prior work in TCP timestamp fingerprinting.  
1. TCP Timestamp Option 
The TCP timestamp option (TSopt field) is an optional 32-bit field in the TCP 
packet header that was first introduced in 1992 in RFC 1323. Its purpose was to improve 
performance and provide reliable operation over paths with high speed (Jacobson, 1992). 
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 The timestamp is a number that represents the perception of time for each party in every 
packet of a TCP flow. RFC 1323 states that the timestamp measurement should be taken 
from a virtual clock that “must be at least approximately proportional to real time” 
(Jacobson, 1992, section 3.3). The virtual clock is not required to be synchronized with 
the system clock and is often independent of a system’s adjustments if network time 
protocol (NTP) is enabled. This virtual clock is usually reset every time a system is 
rebooted. The TCP timestamp clock increases monotonically with a predefined frequency 
between 1 and 1,000 Hz.  
The timestamp option is enabled if the initiator of the TCP flow includes a TSopt 
payload with a timestamp value in its original SYN packet and if the reply indicates that 
both hosts implement the option. For the fingerprinting methodology we employ, we 
require the remote host to support the TCP timestamp option and have open ports that can 
be used to initiate a TCP session.  
2. Prior Work 
Chen et al. (2008) extend techniques originally introduced by Kohno et al. (2005) 
for remote OS fingerprinting. Chen et al. (2008) examine timestamp skew behavior 
between (unspecified versions of) Windows and Linux, both running on bare metal and 
running as virtualized guest operating systems on either VMWare or Xen. In their 
experiment, they send several hundred SYN packets to the target host for an unspecified 
amount of time. They calculate the frequency at which the TCP timestamp clock 
increases and use this to calculate the skew of the target’s time source. This is achieved 
by comparing the actual time the target’s response packet is received and the time 
recorded in the response’s TCP options. The perceived skew is measured over time and 
used to generate a mean squared error (MSE) or randomness indicator associated with 
the target. They compare the MSEs associated with bare metal and virtualized targets, 
concluding that virtualized operating systems can be fingerprinted based on MSE 
behavior. In particular, Chen et al. (2008) suggest skew can be used to distinguish 
virtualized systems from bare metal systems, and to distinguish identical guest OSes 
hosted on different hypervisors. 
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 C. TEST PLAN  
We conduct all tests in an isolated environment on a small local network. Our test 
environment consists of five Optiplex 755 desktop machines with Intel Duo Core CPUs 
and 8GB of RAM. One of these machines, called sniffer, serves as the active host 
performing remote fingerprinting. The remaining machines (M1, M2, M3, M4) act as 
targets in various configurations (see Table 8). Details of the versions of the hypervisors 
and operating systems used in the M1–M4 host configurations are summarized in Table 
9. The sniffer machine employs the same version of Fedora 19 used in the target host 
configurations. All virtualized configurations are run in full virtualization mode, meaning 
the guest operating system is unaware that it is being virtualized. Xen supports full 
virtualization by using Qemu (see Chapter II).  
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 Table 8.   Target Host Configuration Summary  
NOTATION CONFIGURATION Type of Virtualization IP ADDRESS MACHINE 
[F] Fedora 19 bare metal - 10.10.10.2 M1 
[F/F] Fedora 19 running VMWare with Fedora 19 guest Full 10.10.10.21 M1 
[W/F] Fedora 19 running VMWare with Windows 7 guest Full 10.10.10.22 M1 
[RT/F] Fedora 19 running VMWare with PREEMPT_RT guest Full 10.10.10.23 M1 
[X] Xen bare metal - 10.10.10.3 M2 
[F/X] Xen running Fedora 19 guest / DomU Full 10.10.10.31 M2 
[W/X] Xen running Windows 7 guest / DomU Full 10.10.10.32 M2 
[RT/X] Xen running PREEMPT_RT guest / DomU Full 10.10.10.33 M2 
[RT] PREEMPT_RT bare metal - 10.10.10.4 M3 
[W] Windows 7 bare metal - 10.10.10.5 M4 
[F/W] Windows 7 running VMWare with Fedora19 guest Full 10.10.10.51 M4 
[W/W] Windows 7 running VMWare with Windows 7 guest Full 10.10.10.52 M4 
[RT/W] Window 7 running VMWare with PREEMPT_RT guest Full 10.10.10.53 M4 
Table 9.   Target Host Software Summary 
Name VERSION 
Fedora 19 32-bit 3.14.23-100.fc19.i686.PAE Linux kernel 
Windows 7 32-bit Windows 7 Professional 6.1.7601 Service Pack 2 
Linux with PREEMPT_RT patch Ubuntu 12.04.3-desktop-i386 with the Linux 3.12.1-rt4 kernel 
VMWare VMWare Workstation 10.0.3 build-1895310 
Xen Xen-3.0-x86_64 
Xen Dom0 Debian 3.2.0-4-amd64 
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 In the test environment: all machines are connected to a local switch; IP addresses 
are statically assigned; firewalls and Network Time Protocol services are disabled on 
operating systems and all hypervisors use bridged devices for networking. 
1. Hardware and Software Decisions  
The intent of our test environment and target host configurations is to replicate 
prior work as closely as possible; however, Chen et al. (2008) did not indicate the 
specific versions of operating systems or hypervisors they employ. Further, Kohno et 
al.’s (2005) experiments, cited by Chen et al. (2008), employ software that (presumably) 
was current circa 2005. We had no selection criteria beyond VMWare Workstation, Xen 
and some Linux distribution, considered current as of 2005 or 2008. Thus, selecting 
newer software was not a criterion for us. 
Hardware decisions were based on the availability of five machines with identical 
physical profiles. We chose VMWare Workstation 10 because we were unable to obtain 
an older version of VMWare. Our choice of Windows 7 Service Pack 2 was based on its 
compatibility with VMWare Workstation 10 and its status as an older but still heavily 
used Windows distribution. We chose Xen release 3.0 with Debian running in Dom0 
because installation instructions were readily obtainable. We chose Fedora 19 because 
one of our planned10 target configurations used RTEMS, whose build instructions 
required Fedora 19. We chose real-time Linux using the PREEMPT_RT patch because it 
is open-source and readily available. Our decision to build real-time Linux using Ubuntu 
12.04-LTS with the PREEMPT_RT patch was based on forum recommendations (Ask 
Ubuntu, n.d.) suggesting this is a stable distribution for which the patch works, and based 
on availability of patch instructions.  
2. Test Execution 
For each test configuration, we capture two separate TCP sessions with sniffer, 
one 90 minutes long and one 10 minutes long. For each session, we probe each host 
10 Later, we abandoned employing RTEMS in our experiments, due to difficulty in configuring the 
RTOS to run on our physical machine profile. 
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 configuration through banner grabbing with netcat. During each session, we capture all 
traffic using tcpdump. Table 10 summarizes the ports used for each operating system. 
Chen et al. (2008) only capture SYN packets, whereas we capture all packets in the 
session.  
Table 10.   Ports/Services Used to Generate TCP traffic 
OS PORT SERVICE 
Fedora  22 SSH 
Windows 445 Active Directory 
Xen (Debian Dom0) 111 RPC 
PREEMPT_RT 22 SSH 
 
To obtain TCP timestamp values from a TCP session, we employ a Python script 
(tcp_skew.py) written by Russell Fink of the University of Maryland, Baltimore (Fink, 
n.d.) to parse the packet capture. For each packet, this script extracts the time recorded in 
the options field of the TCP packet (T) and the timestamp recorded by tcpdump running 
on sniffer (t). Figure 25 shows sample output from this script.  
 
Figure 25.  Example Output from tcp_skew.py Code 
We normalize measurements for each session by subtracting the time associated 
with the start of packet capture, using another script (tcp_clock.py). In particular, this 
script calculcates (Ti - T0) for TCP timestamps and (ti - t0) for tcpdump timestamps. Using 
these values, we adapt the formula of Chen et al. (2008) for calculating the target’s clock 
T t 
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 frequency. Chen’s original formula is F = (T1 - T2) / (t1 - t2). We use F = (Tlast - T0) / (tlast - 
t0), believing this may provide a similarly accurate reading. We validate this assumption 
in testing (see Observation 2). 
We use the derived frequency F for each operating system to generate clock 
readings. We translate TCP timestamps into a set of clock readings following Chen et al. 
(2008), by calculating (Ti - T0)/F. There are two clocks that can be compared with these 
values: the time elapsed locally (xi = ti - t0) and the time elapsed on the target (wi = (Ti - 
T0)/F). For each configuration, we generate a scatter plot of the target’s skew, plotting 
time elapsed on sniffer (xi) on the x-axis and the skew (yi = wi - xi) on the y-axis. 
Appendices A through G include all graphs generated for our experiment.  
Given the calculated skew, we use Chen et al.’s (2008) method to calculate the 
MSE for each configuration. We use linear least-squares fitting to find a best-fit line, f(x) 
for the timeseries data. We calculate the MSE for the best-fit line by adding the squares 
of the offsets and dividing by the number of TCP packets in the traffic capture, N (See 
Figure 26). Chen et al. (2008) characterize the MSE as a randomness indicator, to be 
used as the baseline for comparison between bare-metal and virtualized operating 
systems. 
( ) 2i ii f x y
N
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Figure 26.  MSE Equation 
3. Test Notation 
Given the number of configurations we are testing, we require a simplified means 
of characterizing our observations. We have therefore developed configuration notation 
for the purposes of summarizing individual tests and sets of tests (see Tables 8 and 11). 
In cases where we describe multiple configurations, we use variables. For example, 
MSE[A/X] is equivalent to the set MSE values MSE[F/X], MSE[W/X], MSE[RT/X]. 
Comparing the MSE values MSE[A/F] and MSE[B] is equivalent to comparing all pairs 
between sets {MSE[F/F], MSE[W/F], MSE[RT/F]} and {MSE[F], MSE[W], MSE[X], 
MSE[RT]}. The notation MSE[RT-S] indicates MSE[RT-1FF] and MSE[RT-1RR]. 
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 Similarly, comparing MSE[RT-S/F] and MSE[RT-T/W]} is equivalent to considering all 
pairwise comparisons between sets {MSE[RT-1FF/F], MSE[RT-1RR/F]} and {MSE[RT-
1FF/W], MSE[RT-1RR/W]}. When considering sets of MSE values S1 and S2, we abuse 
notation: S1≈S2 means ‘the MSE values of S1 are similar to those of S2’, S1>S2 means 
‘the MSE values of S1 are large compared to those of S2,’ and S1≠S2 means ‘the MSE 
values of S1 are dissimilar to those of S2.’ 
Table 11.   Experiment Notation Summary 
Notation Meaning 
Ti TCP timestamp i 
ti tcpdump timestamp i 
F Frequency of target configuration 
xi Time elapsed on sniffer (x-axis of scatter plot) 
wi Time elapsed on target configuration (based on TCP timestamp) 
yi TCP clock skew (y-axis of scatter plot) 
RT-1FF PREEMPT_RT configured with sshd process prioirty 1, FIFO scheduling 
RT-1RR PREEMPT_RT configured with sshd process prioirty 1, round-robin scheduling 
 
D. ANALYSIS 
We validate many of Chen et al.’s (2008) original findings; however, we find one 
of their conclusions—that virtualized operating systems can be easily fingerprinted 
because of their dramatically different TCP time skew variation—is not entirely 
convincing in light of our experimentation with some (previously unevaluated) 
configurations. We divide the analysis that follows into a series of individual 
observations. 
1. Observation 1: MSE Is Not Sensitive to Session Length 
Chen et al. (2008) do not specify the amount of time they run each packet capture 
but state that experiments conclude within “a few minutes.” We want to determine if the 
length of the packet capture has any impact on the MSE calculation. We do this by 
comparing two packet captures for each bare metal target ([F], [W], [X] and [RT]). We 
find that that the average MSE difference between 10 minute and 90 minute captures is 
0.026ms, leading us to conclude that the capture length does not have a significant impact 
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 on MSE calculation. Figure 27 shows the time series data for [F] under both time frames 
(see Appendix A and B for other configurations). The time values on these two packet 
captures are different since packet times vary for each packet capture. This explains the 
visually incongruous lines in Figure 27. The skew behavior however is comparable. We 
conclude that Chen et al.’s (2008) “a few minutes” timeframe provides a relatively stable 
MSE calculation, as longer time frames do not significantly impact these calculations. 
Based on this observation, we conduct all subsequent tests using 10-minute packet 
captures. 
 
Figure 27.  Configuration [F], Skew vs. Time, 1.5 hour Capture (Blue) and 10-
Minute Capture (Red) 
2. Observation 2: Frequency Calculation Appears Relatively Stable with 
Respect to Packet Selection 
Chen et al. (2008) present a method for measuring the operating systems’ TCP 
clock frequency remotely. As explained in Section 3, we modify their equation by 
looking at the first and last timestamps: F = (Tlast - T0) / (tlast - t0). We verify that our 
modified equation has no impact to this calculation after rounding the result to the nearest 
real frequency interval, as Chen et al. (2008) suggest. To confirm that the choice of 
packets used to calculate frequency is arbitrary, we calculated (Tj - Ti) / (tj-ti) for every 
j>i>0. These calculations also have no impact to the frequency calculation. For our 
Linux configurations we compare our result to the actual operating systems’ clock 
frequency configuration by looking at the kernel configuration file. We do not do this for 
our Windows configurations because, to our knowledge, this information is not 
accessible within Windows. Table 12 summarizes our frequency results.  
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 Table 12.   Frequency Results 
Operating 
System 
Calculated Frequency (Hz) 
(Tlast - T0) / (tlast - t0) 
Calculated 
Frequency (Hz) 




[F] 1000 1000 1000 
[W] 100 100 N/A 
[X] 250 250 250 
[RT] 250 250 250 
 
3. Observation 3: MSE[A] ≠ MSE[B] (for all A≠B, except [RT]) 
Chen et al. (2008) observe different MSE behaviors for Windows running on bare 
metal and for Linux running on bare metal. They did not record a bare metal MSE value 
for Xen’s Dom0. Chen et al. (2008) found the MSE value for bare metal Windows is very 
high, attributing this to that configuration yielding the lowest measured frequency value 
(10Hz) among all target configurations. Our results match Chen’s as illustrated in Table 
13. Excluding [RT] configurations, all our bare metal configurations exhibit dissimilar 
MSE behavior. In agreement with Chen et al.’s observations, our [W] configuration has 
the highest MSE value, possibly due to its low clock frequency compared to that of other 
configurations (see Table 13).  
Table 13.   Bare Metal MSEs Excluding [RT] 





4. Observation 4: No Obvious Difference in MSE Behavior between 
Virtualized and Bare Metal Configurations 
Chen et al. (2008) conclude that virtualized hosts have “more perturbed clock 
skew behavior” than bare metal hosts which they claim is observable through MSE. Our 
results also reflect a difference between bare metal and virtualized MSE but less 
pronounced than in prior work.  
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 a. Observation 4a: MSE[F/A] ≈ MSE[F] 
Chen et al. (2008) conclude that virtualized instances of Linux exhibit orders of 
magnitude larger MSE than Linux running on bare metal. In particular, their results show 
almost 300,000% change between bare metal Linux and Linux on VMWare, and 173% 
change (Chen et al., 2008)11 between bare metal Linux and Linux running on Xen. We 
find our virtualized Fedora configurations demonstrate at least one order of magnitude 
change compared to the bare metal configuration, but the changes are smaller than Chen 
et al.’s observations suggest (see Table 14).  




(ms) from MSE[F] 
CHANGE  
% from MSE[F] 
[F] 0.086 - - 
[F/F] 0.221 -0.134 -156% 
[F/W] 0.756 -0.67 779% 
[F/X] 1.586 -1.5 -1744% 
 
b. Observation 4b: MSE[W/A] ≈ MSE[W] 
Chen et al. (2008) find noticeable differences in MSE behavior among virtualized 
and bare metal Windows configurations. In particular, they observe a 22% change 
between bare metal Windows and Windows running on VMWare and an 8% change 
between bare metal Windows and Windows running on Xen. Chen et al. (2008) claim 
these changes are statistically meaningful under Z-test analysis, making “the randomness 
introduced by VMM very obvious.” We find, however that there is not a substantial 
difference between [W] and its virtualized counterparts ([W/W], [W/F], [W/X]) in terms 
of MSE. In fact, comparing [W] with [W/W], changes in MSE behavior appears fairly 
negligible (see Table 15).  
 
 
11 See 0.083 ms2 MSE for baseline Linux and 245.8 ms2 MSE for Linux on VMWare; we calculate 
difference as ((0.083-245.8)/0.083)*100. 
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 Table 15.   Windows Configuration MSEs 
CONFIGURATION MSE (ms) 
DIFFERENCE  
(ms) from MSE[W] 
CHANGE  
% from MSE[W] 
[W] 8.156 - - 
[W/W] 8.066 0.09 1.1% 
[W/F] 6.873 1.283 15.7% 
[W/X] 8.658 -0.502 -6% 
 
5. Observation 5: MSE[A/F] ≠ MSE[A/W] 
Chen et al. (2008) do not clarify what configuration of VMWare they use in their 
experiment and do not comment on any difference in behavior of VMWare on Windows 
vs. VMWare on Linux. We find that configurations [A/W] and [A/F] appear different in 
terms of MSE, suggesting that the host OS for VMWare Workstation impacts 
fingerprinting substantially (see Table 16). 
Table 16.   MSE[A/W] vs. MSE[A/F] 
[A/W] 
CONFIGURATION 
MSE (ms) [A/F] 
CONFIGURATION 
MSE (ms) 
[F/W] 0.756 [F/F] 0.221 
[W/W] 8.066 [W/F] 6.873 
 
6. Observation 6: MSE[A/X] > {MSE[A/F], MSE[A/W], MSE[A]} for all 
A ≠ [RT] 
Chen et al. (2008) observe that Windows on Xen and Linux on Xen exhibit 
smaller MSE values than Linux on VMWare and Windows on VMWare. They suggest 
“Xen introduces much less randomness than VMWare does, probably because they have 
different algorithms for firing software interrupts.” In contrast, we observe [F/X] 
demonstrates higher MSE than [F], [F/W] or [F/F] (see Table 14); also, [W/X] 
demonstrates higher MSE than [W], [W/W] or [W/F] (see Table 15). This contradicts 
Chen et al.’s observations that Xen introduces less randomness than VMWare. It is, 
however, in-line with their larger observation that one can observe MSE differences 
among hypervisors, albeit somewhat more limited.  
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 7. Observation 7: MSE[RT] ≠ MSE[A] for all A ≠ RT 
We extend the prior work of Chen et al. (2008) to consider fingerprinting an 
RTOS. Our [RT] configuration’s MSE value is different from the MSE values of other 
bare metal configurations as illustrated in Table 17. This result agrees with our findings 
in Observation 3; i.e., that bare metal configuration MSE behaviors are dissimilar from 
one another.  
Table 17.   Bare Metal MSE with [RT] Configuration 






8. Observation 8: MSE[RT] ≈ MSE[RT/F] ≈ MSE[RT/W] ≈ MSE[RT/X] 
We observe that, relative to configuration [RT], its virtualized counterparts 
demonstrate the lowest MSE difference among all our virtualized configurations. When 
these differences are translated into percentages however, it appears that virtualized 
instances of [RT] do not display any substantial change compared to other [RT/A] 
configurations. Table 18 summarizes our findings with the [RT] configuration i.e., using 
sshd’s default service priority12 and the default scheduling policy, Linux Completely Fair 
Scheduler (SCHED_NORMAL). This observation agrees with Observation 4, where we 
find no obvious difference between [A] configurations and their [A/B] counterparts, 




12 Default priority is 0 since there is no prioritization associated with SCHED_NORMAL, which is the 
default universal time-sharing scheduler policy in our configuration.   
 85 
                                                 
 Table 18.   PREEMPT_RT Configuration MSEs 
CONFIGURATION MSE DIFFERENCE  (ms) from MSE[RT] 
% CHANGE  
from MSE[RT] 
[RT] 1.337 - - 
[RT/F] 1.395 -0.058 -4.3% 
[RT/W] 1.788 -0.451 -34% 
[RT/X] 1.297 0.04 2.99% 
 
9. Observation 9: MSE[RT] ≈ MSE[RT-1FF] ≈ MSE[RT-1RR] 
We observe differences in MSE behavior when altering the PREEMPT_RT 
configuration in terms of target service priority and scheduling policy (Round Robin vs. 
FIFO).  
For configuration [RT-1FF], we make the following two changes: we adjust the 
priority of sshd using the chrt command to be priority 1, i.e., the highest process priority 
level; we change the scheduling class to FIFO. For configuration [RT-1RR] we make the 
same changes but use Round Robin scheduling class instead of FIFO. We find these [RT-
S] configurations have similar MSE behavior relative to our [RT] configuration. Table 19 
summarizes our findings for the FIFO configurations and Table 20 summarizes our 
findings for the Round Robin configurations.  
Table 19.   PREEMPT_RT with sshd Priority 1, FIFO Scheduling Class 
CONFIGURATION MSE DIFFERENCE  (ms) from MSE[RT-1FF] 
%CHANGE  
from MSE[RT-1FF] 
[RT-1FF] 1.387 - - 
[RT-1FF/F] 1.343 0.044 3.17% 
[RT-1FF/W] 12.669 -11.282 -813% 
[RT-1FF/X] 1.343 0.044 3.17% 
Table 20.   PREEMPT_RT with sshd Priority 1, Round-Robin Scheduling Class 
CONFIGURATION MSE DIFFERENCE  (ms) from MSE[RT-1RR] 
% CHANGE  
from MSE[RT-1RR] 
[RT-1RR] 1.315 - - 
[RT-1RR/F]  1.404 -0.089 -6.7% 
[RT-1RR/W] 11.349 -10.034 -763% 
[RT-1RR/X] 1.317 -0.002 -0.15% 
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 10. Observation 10: MSE[RT-S/W] > {MSE[RT], MSE[RT-T], 
MSE[RT/A]} 
We observe our [RT-S/W] configurations result in a much higher MSE than all 
other [RT] configurations, indicating that Windows 7 has an impact on our [RT] 
configuration when scheduling class and process priority are altered. Table 21 lists MSEs 
for other configurations not listed in Tables 19 and 20 as points of comparison.  
Table 21.   MSE[RT-S/W] vs. other MSE[RT] Configurations 








11. Observation 11: MSE[RT-S/A] ≈ MSE[RT-T] ≈ MSE[RT] for A ≠ W 
We observe that, aside from our [RT-S/W] configurations, MSE for [RT-S/A] are 
similar to both [RT] and [RT-S] configurations. This observation agrees with 
Observations 4, 8 and 9. Continuing the trend in Observations 4 and 8, we see no obvious 
difference in MSE between [RT-S/A] and [RT-S]. Combined with Observation 9 on the 
similarity between [RT-S] and [RT-T], this implies the similarity in MSE for all 
configurations [RT-S/A] compared to [RT] (see Tables 19, 20 and 21). 
12. Observation 12: MSE[RT-S/A] ≈ MSE[RT-T/B] for A, B ≠ W 
We observe that, aside from our [RT-S/W] configurations, the MSE behavior for 
all virtualized [RT-T] configurations is similar. In fact, our results show identical MSE 
for [RT-1FF/X] and [RT-1FF/F] (see Tables 19, 20 and 21). 
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 13. Observation 13: [A/B] is more like [A] than [B] for A ≠ B and A≠F 
Chen et al. (2008) do not report MSE comparing the virtualized guest and its bare 
metal host. We extend this work by investigating which MSE virtualized guests most 
closely resemble. We find that (with the exception of our [F/B] configurations) all [A/B] 
configurations more closely resemble the MSE of [A] instead of [B]. Table 22 
summarizes our findings.  






(%) from MSE[F] 
DIFFERENCE 
(ms) /CHANGE 





(%) from MSE 
[RT] 
(ms) % (ms) % (ms) % (ms) % 
[F/W] 0.756 7.404 90.780 -0.670 -779.068 - - - - 
[F/X] 1.586 - - -1.500 -1744.186 -0.166 -11.638 - - 
[W/F] 6.873 1.287 15.780 -6.787 -7891.860 - - - - 
[W/X] 8.658 -0.498 -6.106 - - -7.238 -509.218 - - 
[RT/F] 1.395 - - -1.309 -1522.093 - - -0.058 -4.338 
[RT/W] 1.788 6.372 78.127 - - - - -0.451 -33.732 
 
E. DISCUSSION  
The purpose of our study is to replicate the work of Chen et al. (2008) to 
investigate if their observations appear relatively stable, and generalize to real-time 
systems under virtualization. Overall, our experiments show that fingerprinting behavior 
of VMWare Workstation guests is dependent on the underlying host operating system. 
Our work also shows that when using MSE as a metric to compare virtualized operating 
systems, there is no easily observable difference between operating systems running on 
different hypervisors.  
As with Chen et al. (2008), our work suggests there is a strong correlation 
between an operating system’s TCP clock frequency and its fingerprint. Operating 
systems with lower frequency values (e.g., Windows) have higher MSE values and lower 
percentages of difference between baseline and experimental MSE values. Operating 
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 systems with higher frequency values (e.g., Fedora) have lower MSE values and high 
percentages of difference between baseline and experimental MSE values.  
Our work also reveals some interesting behavior of virtualized operating systems, 
particularly in the [RT-1FF/W] and [RT-1RR/W] configurations. The MSE behavior for 
these configurations is dramatically different from [RT], [RT-S] and [RT-T/A] 
configurations. Of note is the observation that only the [F/F] and [F/W] configurations 
have MSE behavior that more closely resembled the host OS instead of the guest. We 
investigate the reason for this behavior as future work.  
There are several limitations to our experiment that may have impacted the 
generality of our results. Our setup lacked extraneous network and CPU load, as host and 
guest had limited background processes running and had exclusive use of a local 
network. As future work, these experiments may be re-run on a typical network for an 
enterprise or in a setting with multiple processes competing for CPU time to see if the 
results change. We also do not run our experiments on multiple physical machine 
profiles. To confirm the generality of our observed behaviors one would re-run these 
experiments on different physical machine profiles, i.e., to investigate how much TCP 
timestamp skew variation can be attributed to the operating system and how much can be 
attributed to the hardware. Also, all the tested virtualized configurations are based on full 
virtualization. We suggest re-running our tests with different virtualization settings, such 
as paravirtualization and hardware-assisted virtualization to see how MSE behavior 
compares.  
A possible limitation of our work is the use of tcpdump to label time of receipt for 
each TCP packet at the sniffer machine. We suggest re-running these experiment to 
employ a system clock timestamp, rather than relying on a user-land application’s 
perception of time. Our experiment could also benefit if the operating system choices 
were more consistent. We chose a different version of Linux with a different frequency to 
run our Xen Dom0 ([X] configuration) compared to our other Linux configurations. We 
suggest standardizing these software choices for consistency and comparison. We further 
suggest experimenting with different Linux distributions and different kernel versions. It 
would be interesting to see how our results compare to newer operating systems. Finally, 
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 additional research should consider statistical metrics for comparison to see if they offer 
more insight into the behavior of different hypervisors and virtualized operating systems 
in the context of fingerprinting.  
Our work is an attempt to capture the TCP timestamp skew behavior of a set of 
general-purpose and real-time operating systems in an isolated, controlled environment. 
Our results differ from Chen et al. (2008) and suggest that hypervisor and operating 
system fingerprinting is not clearly predictable from MSE. We propose some future work 
to carry this research forward.  
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 VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Virtualization is a promising field of research for the space community, and its 
implementation in space research projects indicates that it is a technology that the space 
community appears committed to utilizing. In this thesis we have sought to highlight 
some key security-relevant properties of real-time operating systems and virtualization 
architectures for space systems. Our work has revealed the diversity of architectures 
supporting virtualized for the space domain, and the ways in which these virtualization 
architectures handle real-time requirements of guests. Our work highlights some tradeoffs 
associated with security, flexibility, popularity and compatibility with other systems and 
hardware. The purpose of our survey was to explain, at a high level, the fundamental 
differences and similarities between real-time operating systems and virtualization 
solutions for space. A limitation of this survey was that we did not analyze the 
implementation of consequential security features in the surveyed systems. We leave as 
future work the analysis of enforcement mechanisms for key security functionality, such 
as memory management or spatial isolation. For unevaluated systems, penetration testing 
may be warranted to investigate these security properties.  
We have also presented an experimental investigation of remote fingerprinting 
based TCP timestamp skew for virtualized operating systems. This extended prior work, 
considering timestamp skew behavior for the Linux PREEMPT_RT patch running on 
bare metal, on Xen and on VMWare Workstation. We suggest (see Chapter V) 
continuation of this work is warranted, by re-running experiments on a public network, 
on different hardware, with different virtualization setttings etc. We also leave as future 
work the inclusion of other real-time operating systems in this evaluation, such as 
RTEMS and FreeRTOS, as well as alternative virtualization platforms such as XtratuM 
and NOVA and others surveyed in this thesis.  
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 APPENDIX A.  BARE METAL, 1.5-HOUR RUN 
In this appendix, we provide data associated with experiments discussed in 
Chapter V. Figures 28–31 show the results of experiments with bare metal configurations 
([F], [X], [W], [RT]) after 1.5-hour packet capture. 
 
Figure 28.  Configuration [F], Skew vs. Time, 1.5 Hour Packet Capture 
 




Figure 30.  Configuration [W], Skew vs. Time, 1.5 hour Packet Capture 
 
Figure 31.  Configuration [RT], Skew vs. Time, 1.5 Hour Packet Capture  
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 APPENDIX B.  BARE METAL, 10-MINUTE RUN 
In this appendix, we provide data associated with experiments discussed in 
Chapter V. Figures 32–35 show the results of experiments with bare metal configurations 
([F], [X], [W], [RT]) after 10-minute packet capture. 
 
Figure 32.  Configuration [F], Skew vs. Time, 10-Minute Packet Capture 
 
Figure 33.  Configuration [X], Skew vs. Time, 10-Minute Packet Capture 
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Figure 34.  Configuration [W], Skew vs. Time, 10-Minute Packet Capture 
 
Figure 35.  Configuration [RT], Skew vs. Time, 10-Minute Packet Capture 
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 APPENDIX C.  VIRTUALIZED LINUX 
In this appendix, we provide data associated with experiments discussed in 
Chapter V. Figures 36–38 show the results of experiments with virtualized Linux 
configurations ([F/F], [F/W], [F/X]). 
 
Figure 36.  Configuration [F/F], Skew vs. Time 
 













Figure 38.  Configuration [F/X], Skew vs. Time 
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 APPENDIX D.  VIRTUALIZED WINDOWS 
In this appendix, we provide data associated with experiments discussed in 
Chapter V. Figures 39–41 show the results of experiments with virtualized Windows 
configurations ([W/F], [W/W], [W/X]). 
 
Figure 39.  Configuration [W/F], Skew vs. Time 
 













Figure 41.  Configuration [W/X], Skew vs. Time 
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 APPENDIX E.  VIRTUALIZED PREEMPT_RT 
In this appendix, we provide data associated with experiments discussed in 
Chapter V. Figures 42–44 show the results of experiments with virtualized 
PREEMPT_RT configurations ([RT/F], [RT/W], [RT/X]). 
 
Figure 42.  Configuration [RT/F], Skew vs. Time 
 













Figure 44.  Configuration [RT/X], Skew vs. Time 
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 APPENDIX F.  PREEMPT_RT, FIFO SCHEDULING 
In this appendix, we provide data associated with experiments discussed in 
Chapter V. Figures 45–48 show the results of experiments with PREEMPT_RT with 
FIFO scheduling and sshd priority 1 ([RT-1FF], [RT-1FF/F], [RT-1FF/W], [RT-1FF/X]). 
 
Figure 45.  Configuration [RT-1FF], Skew vs. Time 
 
Figure 46.  Configuration [RT-1FF/F], Skew vs. Time 
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Figure 47.  Configuration [RT-1FF/W], Skew vs. Time 
 
Figure 48.  Configuration [RT-1FF/X], Skew vs. Time 
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 APPENDIX G.  PREEMPT_RT, ROUND ROBIN SCHEDULING 
In this appendix, we provide data associated with experiments discussed in 
Chapter V. Figures 49–52 show the results of experiments with PREEMPT_RT with 
round robin scheduling and sshd priority 1 ([RT-1RR], [RT-1RR/F], [RT-1RR/W], [RT-
1RR/X]). 
 
Figure 49.  Configuration [RT-1RR], Skew vs. Time 
 
Figure 50.  Configuration [RT-1RR/F], skew vs. time 
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Figure 51.  Configuration [RT-1RR/W], Skew vs. Time 
 
Figure 52.  Configuration [RT-1RR/X], Skew vs. Time 
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 SUPPLEMENTAL 
Code to run the experiment and generated data from Chapter V is available in the 
CISR Archive, which may be accessed at the Computer Science Department of the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  
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